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THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE 
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 
Daniel A. Farber* and John E Muench** 
Most of the vast historical literature about the fourteenth 
amendment addresses the legislative intent regarding specific is-
sues such as school segregation. Our purpose is broader. Our 
concern is less with whether the framers believed in school segre-
gation than with how they felt about natural law. What did they 
regard as the sources of human rights? How did they think those 
rights related to the Constitution? In what ways did they expect 
the amendment to change that relationship? How did their ideas 
about rights relate to their thoughts about citizenship and govern-
ment, and to the experiences of Civil War and reconstruction? 
Our goal, then, is an intellectual history of the amendment. 
Our thesis is that the fourteenth amendment was based on a 
coherent theory of government. By the time it attained power in 
1861, the Republican party had become identified with a well-ar-
ticulated theory of rights. This theory was something of a com-
promise between natural law and legal positivism. Like natural 
law, it envisioned a body of inherent human rights protected by a 
social contract. But like positivism, it recognized that a legislature 
could impose its will regardless of natural law. Natural law and 
associated concepts like the law of nations provided rules that 
functioned as law except where they were displaced by positive 
legislation. 
Before the Civil War, this theory enabled the Republicans to 
condemn slavery as a violation of higher law, to argue that it was 
illegal in the territories where it lacked express legislative sanc-
tion, but at the same time to concede its legality in the South. 
During reconstruction, this theory continued to provide the 
• Professor of Law. University of Minnesota. 
•• Member. Illinois Bar. The authors would like to thank Professor Paul Murphy 
for his helpful comments on portions of this manuscript. 
NOTE In the interest of readabilit;·.footnoting has been drastically reduced Virtuallr 
all references to secondary sources have been eliminated and manr citations to prima~r 
sources have been eliminated or combined Readers who desire further information should 
consult the .. Note on Sources" at the end of the article. 
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framework for Republican thought. The fourteenth amendment 
was intended to bridge the gap between positive law and higher 
law by empowering the national government to protect the natural 
rights of its citizens. 
I 
We begin by examining the ideas the Republicans brought 
with them when they achieved national power in 1861. The Re-
publican party of 1861 was not a monolith; even the antislavery 
wing had its share of feuds and shifting coalitions. Nevertheless, 
it is appropriate to speak of the antislavery leadership-men like 
Sumner, Seward, Chase, and later Lincoln-as a coherent group, 
united by ideology as well as strong social bonds. Their ideas 
would become the intellectual basis of the fourteenth amendment. 
A 
Many of the antislavery leaders had worked together in the 
Free Soil party before becoming Republicans. They were also 
connected by a web of social and professional contacts. For ex-
ample, when Lincoln was in Congress, he lived in the same room-
ing house as Giddings. Lincoln's law partner corresponded with 
Sumner, who was in close contact with most of the other major 
leaders of the antislavery group. 
Because antislavery leaders were ostracized by Washington 
society, which was dominated by Southerners, they were driven 
together socially. Other forms of Southern antagonism also 
helped bind the group together. After Sumner was severely 
beaten on the Senate floor by a Southern congressman, Cameron, 
Wade, and Chandler entered into a pact to use deadly force if 
necessary to repel attacks. The antislavery Republicans were not 
a conspiracy, but neither were they an atomistic collection of un-
connected individuals. 
Much of what they said about rights sounds naive today. But 
they were far from being unsophisticated idealists. Sumner, a 
close friend of Justice Story, wrote a number of law review articles 
and lectured at Harvard Law School. Despite the "rail-splitter" 
myth, Lincoln was a shrewd, successful railroad lawyer. Seward, 
the future Secretary of State, has been called the ablest constitu-
tional authority of the period. A self-educated cobbler, Wilson 
became a successful manufacturer, a senator, and later an histo-
rian. Before becoming governor of Ohio, Chase was a leading 
Ohio lawyer; later he was to become Chief Justice of the United 
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States Supreme Court. These were not simply starry-eyed 
dreamers. 
Their views were well-known to the public. Interest in poli-
tics was intense, with voter turnouts reaching as high as eighty-
four percent of qualified voters. The public followed Senate de-
bates closely. In one year alone, free-state senators distributed 
680,000 copies of their speeches. Seward's famous "Higher Law" 
speech was distributed to 100,000 people. In the 1860 campaign, 
the Republican party issued large editions of the Lincoln-Douglas 
debates in order to publicize Lincoln's views. These speeches 
would not have been circulated so extensively unless politicians 
were convinced that they would appeal to large portions of the 
public. Antislavery views were also publicized at public rallies. 
For instance, Charles Frances Adams once addressed a Philadel-
phia rally of nearly half the city's voters. The antislavery leaders 
were highly successful in having their views incorporated into 
early GOP state platforms and much of their viewpoint was repre-
sented in the 1856 and 1860 national platforms. When the North 
elected Lincoln in 1860, it could hardly have been ignorant of his 
views and those of many of his party's leaders. 
What were their views? Ironically, they favored prohibiting 
slavery in new territories, where there were few slaves, but op-
posed intervention in the South, where there were millions. 1 Both 
parts of this "anti-extensionism" program are significant. Lincoln 
considered the territorial principle so important that he rejected 
all proposals to compromise on this issue to avoid civil war. On 
the other hand, some antislavery Republicans like Adams were 
willing to support the proposed thirteenth amendment, which 
would have permanently protected slavery in the states from fed-
eral interference. 
One reason for opposition to slavery in the territories was ra-
cism, which was widespread in the North. For many, the issue 
was not so much exclusion of black slaves as exclusion of all 
blacks. Many Republicans found it necessary to reaffirm their 
-----~--~-~ ---
I. In the debates with Douglas. Lincoln stressed that he had ··no purpose. directly or 
indirectly. to interfere with the institution of slavery in the States where it exists." THE 
POLITICAL DEBATES BETWEEN ABRAHAM LINCOLN AND STEPHEt-< A. DOUGLAS (Part I) 
209 (G. Putnam ed. 1913); see also 1d. at 53. As Rep. Hoard said in the debates on Kansas: 
With regard to slavery in the States. we have no difficulty: and the slave-States 
need entertain no fears of any free-State interference. 
CoNe,. GLOBE. 35th Cong. 1st Sess. App. 275 ( 1858). See also id .. 33d Cong .. 2d Sess. App. 
318 (1855) (Rep. Giddings) (North will"be purified from the crimes and iniquities of slav-
ery" but "leave the institution with the slave States, untouched by our legislation." thus 
guarding "all the States in the enjoyment of their privileges.") 
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disinclination toward miscegenation2 and their belief in white 
supremacy.3 Nevertheless, it is important not to overstate the 
case. Men such as Adams, Hale, Wilson, Seward and Chase vig-
orously supported black rights in the North. The antislavery fac-
tion used its political leverage in Ohio to gain a repeal of the 
harsher provisions of the state's Black Code, and strong Republi-
can support existed for black suffrage. Stevens went so far as to 
direct that he be buried in a black cemetery. Prominent antislav-
ery Republicans, including John Bingham, objected strongly to 
the exclusion of free blacks from homestead rights in Oregon. 
While racism played a larger role with the rank-and-file, it was at 
most a secondary factor influencing the Republican antislavery 
leadership. 4 
Apart from racism, there was great concern about the effect 
of slavery on whites. Northern antislavery writers portrayed the 
South as an economically backward area. They compared de-
crepit rural Virginia with prosperous New England, and blamed 
the contrast on slavery. They also compared the ambitious white 
workers of the North with their less educated and allegedly less 
motivated counterparts in the South, concluding that slavery pro-
duced inferior white workers. In short, they saw slavery as inimi-
cal to prosperity. They were particularly anxious to shield the 
promising new territories of the West from this economic blight.s 
Slavery was also thought to pose a political threat to whites. 
As Sumner put it, "laws which oppress the black man, and de-
prive him of all safeguards of liberty, will eventually enslave the 
white man." Many believed that the South was controlled by a 
slave-owning oligarchy known variously as the Slavocracy or the 
Slave Power. Through its control of the Democratic party, its rep-
resentation in the Senate, and its over-representation in the House 
under the three-fifths rule, the Slave Power had supposedly seized 
control of the country. In the Lincoln-Douglas debates, for exam-
ple, Lincoln portrayed Douglas as a member of a Southern plot to 
2. This was a constant theme in the Lincoln-Douglas Debates. See. e.g .. LINCOLN-
DoUGLAS DEBATES, supra note I. (Part I) at 103.216.270: (Part II) at 2: K. STAMPP. THE 
IMPERILED UI'ION: ESSAYS ON THE BACKGROUND OF THE CiVIL WAR 121 ( 1980). 
3. Within the Free Soil party, racism was strongest among Bambumers (who gener-
ally returned to the Democratic party) and weakest amongst former Liberty party mem-
bers. with the Conscience Whigs in the middle. See J. MAYFIELD. REHEARSAL FOR 
REPUBLICANISM 21-22, 35-36,47-48, 142, 158 (1980). 
4. See E. FONER, FREE SOIL, FREE LABOR, FREE MEN: THE IDEOLOGY OF THE 
REPUBLICAN PARTY BEFORE THE CiVIL WAR 263, 280-95 (1970). 
5. Foner develops this point at length. See E. FoNER, supra note 4. at 40-65. Given 
the common view that God had designed the world in such a way that the naturally good 
and the utilitarian coincided, this economic critique of slavery actually supported the view 
that slavery was morally wrong. 
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extend slavery nationwide.6 Like conspiracy theories in other pe-
riods of the nation's history, the Slave Power theory held that the 
hour was late and that only immediate action could preserve free-
dom. This alarmist view drew strength from a number of South-
em actions: assaults on first amendment rights, demands for 
protection of slavery in the territories, attempts to annex Cuba or 
other parts of Latin American as new slave states, the Dred Scott 
decision, and the Kansas-Nebraska bill. 
Moral opposition to slavery was another powerful influence. 7 
Lincoln proclaimed that this moral stance was the primary differ-
ence between himself and Douglas. For many Republicans, op-
position to slavery was religiously based. Hale and others thought 
slavery was a sin, forbidden by the Word of God, while Giddings 
called opponents of the Republicans "infidels." Chase declared 
that "the cause of human freedom is the cause of God." Others 
believed that slavery was prohibited by the Bible because God 
gave Adam dominion over the beasts, but not over his fellow men. 
Many antislavery leaders also based their views on the Declara-
tion of Independence, with its stress on inalienable rights and in-
herent equality. 
Given this moral position, why did the antislavery Republi-
6. LINCOLN-DOUGLAS DEBATES, supra note I, (Part II) at 160-61 (Lincoln predicts a 
"second Dred Scott" decision will extend slavery nationwide). In his famous "House Di-
vided" speech, Lincoln summarized his conspiracy theory as follows: 
(W]hen we see a lot of framed timbers, different portions of which we know have 
been gotten out at different times and places and by different workmen-Stephen 
(Douglas]. Franklin [Pierce], Roger [Taney] and James [Buchanan], for in-
stance-and when we see these timbers joined together, and see they exactly 
make the frame of a house or a mill, all the tenons and mortices exactly fitting. 
and all the lengths and proportions of the different pieces exactly adapted to their 
respective places, and not a piece too many or too few-not omitting even scaf-
folding---{)r, if a single piece be lacking, we can see the place in the frame exactly 
fitted and prepared to yet bring such piece in-in such a case, we find it impossi-
ble to not believe that Stephen and Franklin and Roger and James all understood 
one another from the beginning. and all worked upon a common plan or draft 
drawn up before the first lick was struck. 
2 A. SCHLESINGER, HISTORY OF U.S. PoLITICAL PARTIES 1226 ( 1973). 
7. See LINCOLN-DOUGLAS DEBATES, supra note I, (Part I) at 53 (unlike Douglas. 
American people view slavery as a "vast moral evil"); id. (Part II) at 268 (morality of 
slavery is "the real issue"). In the 1860 Campaign. Douglas was attacked on this policy by 
a pro-Lincoln paper. which said that "(t]he conscience of the country will not permit this 
abnegation of the moral element." H. PERKINS, I NoRTHERN EDITORIALS ON SECESSION 
31 ( 1942). The Hariford Evening Press said during the same campaign that the "chief ques-
tion at issue is one of conscience, involving high moral obligations." /d. at 61. In an 
editorial entitled "The Last Struggle of Slavery," the Springfield (Mass.) D01{r Republican 
said it was "the unanimous verdict of Christendom and heathendom alike. our southern 
states and the [slave trading] kingdom of Dahomey excepted. that the institution of slavery 
is the worst possible perversion of human relations and the most entire violation alike of 
natural and divine law." /d. at 481. Similar sentiments were expressed by the Dubuque 
Dailr Times. /d. at 488. See also id. at 29-31. 
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cans devote their energy to the seemingly unimportant question of 
slavery in the territories? There are two sides to the answer: they 
thought the territorial issue was important; and they thought slav-
ery in the states was beyond their reach. 
They believed the territorial issue was important partly for 
symbolic reasons, but they were also seriously concerned that 
slavery might expand westward. It had taken hold in Missouri 
and might do so elsewhere in the Great Plains, perhaps causing 
the ultimate economic ruin of this vital area. Moreover, the South 
had shown an interest in expanding into Latin American and the 
Caribbean, areas to which the plantation system was well-suited. 
On the other hand, if slavery were confined, it might be expected 
to die. Diminishing political power in the national arena would 
weaken the Slavocracy's power in the South. The mails would be 
opened to antislavery literature, which would soon enlighten 
lower class whites about their real interests. Federal patronage 
might help develop an opposition party in the South. Equally im-
portant, without room to expand the South would lack an outlet 
for its excess population of slaves. Meanwhile, national recogni-
tion of the immorality of slavery would undermine the ideology 
essential to its continuance. Thus, confining slavery would "put 
... [it] in the course of ultimate extinction," as Lincoln put it.s 
Somewhat more graphically, Sumner said slavery would die "as a 
poisoned rat dies of rage in its hole."9 
Despite their moral opposition to slavery, the Republicans 
went to great lengths to disassociate themselves from the aboli-
tionists. Unlike Garrison, they were unwilling to condemn the 
Constitution as an "agreement with Hell." They rejected both 
Northern secession and personal withdrawal from government as 
means of avoiding entanglement with slavery. They also rejected 
the unrealistic view of some abolitionists that the Constitution 
prohibited slavery in the states. Thus, Republicans were commit-
ted to opposing slavery while supporting a Constitution that 
shielded Southern slavery. Men like Lincoln believed they were 
giving away nothing by pledging not to use federal power to abol-
ish slavery in the South, for they believed the federal government 
lacked this power anyway. As Owen Lovejoy said, being against 
monarchy didn't mean he favored a naval armament to dethrone 
Queen Victoria. 
8. See LINCOLN-DOUGLAS DEBATES, supra note I, (Part l) at 52-53. 
9. D. DONALD, CHARLES SUMNER AND THE COMING OF THE CiVIL WAR 361 (1960). 
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B 
To justify their opposition to slavery, the Republicans needed 
a philosophy that satisfied several requirements. It had to provide 
a moral frame of reference outside the status quo from which to 
assess the morality of slavery. Yet it had to leave room for the 
unchallenged right of the South to remain free of direct Northern 
interference within the federalist system. The antislavery Repub-
licans were not original thinkers and would not have been capable 
of inventing such a theory. And, like other reformers in our his-
tory, they were anxious to portray themselves as guardians of the 
original American tradition, not as inventors of a novel ideology. 
Fortunately, a system of thought was at hand that satisfied all 
these requirements. The antislavery Republicans found the intel-
lectual framework they needed in the Enlightenment theories that 
had formed the ideological basis for the American Revolution. 
Locke is the best remembered of these Englightenment think-
ers. His Second Treatise opens with a discussion of the state of 
nature, in which men are free from all government but subject to 
natural law. Among their natural rights are the right to continued 
life and to any property created by their own labor. All men are 
equal in the sense of having an equal right to this natural freedom. 
(The source of these rights is not entirely clear, but seems to be 
partly theological. Men are obliged to respect each other's rights 
because all men are God's handiwork; to harm another man is to 
interfere with God's purposes in creating him. 10) In the state of 
nature, each man has the power to punish transgressions of natu-
ral law by others. Because this power cannot be effectively exer-
cised by unorganized individuals, men delegate their enforcement 
powers to governments. These governments possess only the 
power that was granted through the delegation: the power to pro-
tect the natural rights of men. "[T]he law of nature stands as an 
eternal rule to all men, legislators as well as others." 11 If the gov-
ernment should exceed its powers and turn against the people, 
nothing remains but an "appeal to Heaven," that is, revolution. 
10. For instance. Locke says: 
For men being all the workmanship of one omnipotent and infinitelY wise Maker 
.. they are his property. whose workmanship the~ are. made to list during his. 
notone another"s pleasure: and . there cannot be supposed any such subordi-
natiOn among us . . as if we were made for one another"s uses. 
J. LocKE. THEe SEcor-;o TREATISE OF CI\IL GoVERNMLNT 5 (J Gough ed. 1946). There 
seem to be as many interpretations of Locke as there are commentators. Fortunate!\. the 
subtle problems which divide these commentators are largely irrelevant for our purposes. 
since none of the antislavery Republicans were intellectually attuned to technical philo-
sophical issues. 
II /d. at 68. 
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Lockean theory was remarkably congruent with Republican 
ideology. The vision of the state of nature must have seemed 
fairly realistic in a frontier society. Locke's labor theory of prop-
erty accorded well with the Republican stress on free labor in the 
territories and their generally conservative views on the right to 
property.12 More important, although Locke was willing to toler-
ate slavery under very limited circumstances, his theories pro-
vided powerful arguments against it. Fundamentally, ownership 
of one person by another was inconsistent with their basic equality 
as creations of God. More specifically, slavery as practiced in 
America violated Locke's theory in three respects. First, the 
slave's natural right to life was allegedly not protected under slav-
ery. In some Republicans' view, in any event, the slave was sim-
ply at the mercy of the owner. Second, slaves were denied their 
natural right to property in the fruit of their own labor. Third, 
slaves were excluded from the social compact. 
Although they have been largely forgotten today, three other 
writers of the natural law school were highly influential in eight-
eenth and early-nineteenth century America. These were 
Pufendorf, Vattel, and Burlamaqui. As his major modern com-
mentator says, Pufendorf "is known to American students-when 
he is known at all-as an obscure German with a funny name 
who followed Grotius in the early development of international 
law."l3 His theory stressed man's social nature and his duty to 
protect his fellow men. He also emphasized human equality and 
the compact theory of government. Like Pufendorf and Locke, 
Burlamaqui adopted a compact theory under which government 
acts in excess of the granted power are invalid. Vattel's work 
stressed self-defense as a natural right. A nation is obliged to pre-
serve its members and respect their natural right to self-defense. 
If the sovereign violates these fundamental rights, the populace as 
a whole can withdraw obedience. Even individuals have a right to 
resist extreme injustice, for self-preservation is not only a natural 
right, but also a duty. 
These early natural law theorists created two distinct but con-
nected sources of "higher law" thought. One was the "law of na-
tions," a set of legal norms governing the rights and duties of 
nations. The other was the American version of natural law and 
compact theories of government, adopted in the eighteenth cen-
12. See E. FONER. supra note 4. at 11-39. 
13. L. KRIE<iER. THE POLITICS OF DISCRETIOI'O: PUFENDOR~ Ai'OD THE AccEPTAi'OCE 
OF N.-\TURAL L-\W I ( 1965). 
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tury. Both lines of thought persisted into the nineteenth century 
and entered into antislavery Republican ideology. 
The law of nations has no exact counterpart today. It was a 
blend of what we would now call public international law, polit-
ical theory, conflicts law, and commercial law. It was linked with 
natural law primarily by the idea that nations have no common 
sovereign and therefore are in a state of nature with respect to one 
another. According to Kent, the law of nations derived from 
"principles of right reason, the same views of the nature and con-
stitution of man, and the same sanction of Divine revelation, as 
those from which the science of morality is deduced." The law of 
nations was based on the "general principles of right and justice, 
equally suitable to the government of individuals in a state of 
equality, and to the relations and conduct of nations."I4 
The idea of an unwritten international law was characteristic 
of the legal thought of the time. This was, after all, the age of 
Sw!ft v. Tyson and the "brooding omnipresence" of the common 
law. In Sw!ft itself, Justice Story declared that negotiable-instru-
ment law was, paraphrasing Cicero, not merely "the law of Ath-
ens or Rome" but that of the whole commercial world. The 
extraordinary influence of these ideas can best be seen in Watson 
v. Tarpley .Is Watson was a diversity case brought on a bill of 
exchange by a Mississippi citizen in the federal circuit court for 
Mississippi. A Mississippi statute prohibited suit on any bill of 
exchange until the maturity date, even if the drawee refused ac-
ceptance. The Court refused to follow the Mississippi statute be-
cause "[a] requisition like this would be a violation of the general 
commercial law, which a state would have no power to impose, 
and which the courts of the United States would be bound to dis-
regard."t6 Other Supreme Court decisions apply a similar theory 
to state insolvency laws, holding them valid in the courts of the 
legislating state but not in the courts of any other state or of the 
United States. 17 Thus, the idea of an unwritten law, controlling 
except when a court was directed otherwise by its own legislature, 
was deeply embedded in the legal thinking of the time. 
The law of nations was not silent on the subject of slavery. 
Justice Story, beginning with the premise that slavery is immoral, 
14. See l J. KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW •2-3. 
15. 59 U.S. (18 How.) 517 (!855). 
16. /d.at52l. 
17. Baldwin v. Hale, 68 U.S. ( l Wall.) 223 ( 1863). See also Williamson v. Berry. 49 
U.S. (8 How.) 495 ( 1850) (Court refuses to follow state courts in construing state private 
law): Gelpke v. City of Dubuque, 68 U.S. ( l Wall.) 175 ( 1863) (Court refuses to follow state 
court in construing state constitution). 
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argued that it must be prohibited by the law of nations; the prohi-
bition was judicially enforceable unless "waived by the consent of 
nations." He concluded that a slave ship is guilty of piracy except 
when the flag state permits the slave trade.ts Chief Justice Mar-
shall accepted a similar premise: 
That [slavery) is contrary to the law of nature will scarcely be denied. That 
every man has a natural right to the fruits of his own labour, is generally admit-
ted; and that no other person can rightfully deprive him of those fruits, and ap-
propriate them against his will, seems to be the necessary result of this admission. 
He found, however, that the practice of nations fell lamentably 
short of this standard and hence that the slave trade did not vio-
late internationallaw.t9 The same ambivalence was reflected in 
Kent, who declared that although the slave trade was immoral 
and unjust, it was not piracy unless so declared by treaty or mu-
nicipallaw.zo The attitudes of these Americans were undoubtedly 
influenced by a desire not to give support to British claims of a 
right to visitation of American ships on the high seas. 
Unhampered by this consideration, Story was able to say that 
foreign jurists and tribunals uniformly gave "no effect to the state 
of slavery of a party, whatever it might have been in the country 
of his birth or [previous domicile], unless it is also recognized by 
the laws of the country of his actual domicil [sic], and where he is 
found, and it is sought to be enforced." Excepting only cases gov-
erned by the fugitive slave clause, "the same principle pervades 
the common law of the non-slaveholding States in America; that 
is to say, foreign slaves would no longer be deemed such after 
their removal thither."21 Many American cases supported the 
view that slavery could exist only when supported by local, posi-
tive law. In cases where slaves had been brought to free states for 
more than a brief sojourn, even Southern courts generally ruled 
that they remained free on their return to slave states.22 The 
Republicans made strong use of this "slavery local, freedom na-
tional" view.23 Indeed, without it, anti-extensionism would have 
18. United States v. La Jeune Eugenie, 26 Fed. Cas. 832, 846, 847-851 (C.C.D. Mass. 
1822) (No. 15,551). 
19. 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 66, 120-132 (1825). 
20. J. KENT, supra note 14, at *194-200. 
21. J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS, FOREIGN AND DoMESTIC, 
§ 96 (5th ed. 1857) (citing numerous cases) (footnotes omitted). 
22. See D. FEHRENBACHER, THE DRED SCOTT CASE: ITS SIGNIFICANCE IN AMERI-
CAN LAW AND PoLITICS 50-61,611-14 (1978). 
23. For statements on the local nature of slavery ("slavery local, freedom national") 
see CoNG. GLOBE, 35th Cong. 1st Sess. App. 332, 335 (1858) (Rep. Walton); id at App. 79 
(Sens. Fessenden and Mason); id. at 87-90 (Sen. Clark); CONG. GLOBE, 34th Cong., _1st 
Sess. App. 938 (1856) (Rep. Brenton); id. at 201 (Sen. Trumbull), id. 1164 (Rep. Cragm). 
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been untenable, for the slave relationship would have been auto-
matically transported from Southern states into the territories. 
The natural law tradition also entered Republican thought by 
shaping the ideology underlying the American Revolution. When 
they adopted the Declaration of Independence as the basis of their 
platform, the antislavery Republicans were incorporating a syn-
thesis of eighteenth century natural law thought. 
Well into the nineteenth century, natural law philosophy con-
tinued to play an important role in American law. In Calder v. 
Bu/1,24 Justice Chase declared that even without express constitu-
tional limitations, state governments were limited by "certain vital 
principles in our free Republican governments, which will deter-
mine and overrule an apparent and flagrant abuse of legislative 
power."zs In Fletcher v. Peck, Chief Justice Marshall, not content 
to rest on the contract clause, also relied on "general principles 
which are common to our free institutions."26 A number of state 
court decisions asserted a similar view in the earlier part of the 
nineteenth century.27 
Early nineteenth century commentators also adopted natural 
law theories. Kent called the rights of personal security, liberty 
and property "natural, inherent and unalienable." Drawing on 
natural law writers like Pufendorf, he held that the legislature's 
power to take private property was limited by principles of natural 
equity.zs Other writers like Rawle and Story believed that the 
people have an inherent right to change governments or to amend 
their constitutions without regard to constitutional limitations on 
the amending process. Natural law concepts were also expressed 
by notable lawyers. 
By the 1850's, however, a somewhat diminished degree of be-
lief in natural law became apparent, along with growing skepti-
cism about the reality of the social compact. Increasingly, the 
24. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386-389 (1798). 
25. Dean Ely suggests that Chase could not really have been a believer in natural law. 
since he failed to strike down the state statute in question. Ely, Foreword· On Discovering 
Fundamental Values, 92 HARV. L. REV. 5, 26 n.95 (1978). The explanation for Chase's 
position seems to be, however, that the case was before the Coun on writ of error to a state 
coun, giving the Coun jurisdiction only over federal constitutional claims. See J. GOEBEL. 
HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, ANTECEDENTS AND BEGIN-
NINGS TO 1801, 704-07 (1971). 
26. 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 139 (1810). 
27. See Nelson, The Impact of the Antislavery Movement Upon Szvles of Judicial Rea-
soning in Nineteenth-Century America, 87 HARV. L. REV. 513, 531-32 (1974). 
28. 2 J. KENT, supra note 14, at •1, 339. See also Dash v. Van Kleeck, 7 Johns 477. 
505 (N.Y. 1811) (implicit prohibition on retroactive Jaws). 
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compact was seen as a convenient fiction.29 State courts ruled in 
this period that they had no inherent power to declare laws void 
because of conflict with natural law.Jo Growing reliance on ex-
press constitutional provisions like the due process clause made 
reference to natural law superfluous. Jacksonian Democrats were 
hostile to such assertions of power by judges, while conservatives 
were increasingly troubled by the potential of natural law theories 
to encourage secession, rebellion, or civil disobedience.JI Natural 
law ideas were still advanced by advocates and still appeared in 
strongly worded dissents. But the judicial tide appeared to be 
running against them. 
c 
Although natural law was losing favor in the courts, it contin-
ued to influence antislavery Republicans. In a famous speech, 
Seward said that "there is a higher law than the Constitution" 
governing Congress.32 In the same speech, he declared that slav-
ery was incompatible with natural rights. Similarly, Wade said he 
would never recognize the right of one man to own another 
"[u]ntil the laws of nature and of nature's God are changed."JJ 
For Sumner, the Mexican War was "wrong by the law of nations, 
and by the higher law of God."J4 Another staunch defender of 
the higher law was John Bingham, who later played a crucial role 
in drafting the fourteenth amendment. He replied to criticisms of 
the "higher law" theory as follows: 
(T]he fathers of the Republic never would have made their Constitution; they 
never would have borne the sacred ark of liberty through a seven years' war. if 
they had not believed in a higher law-in the eternal verities of truth and justice. 
That law is of perpetual and of universal obligation. It is obligatory alike upon 
individual and collective man; upon the citizen and upon the State.35 
In a similar vein, Charles Francis Adams said that the "cardi-
29. See, e.g. Piqua Branch of State Bank v. Knoop, 57 U.S. (16 How.) 369,392 (1853) 
(theory of government not relevant to judicial decisionmaking). . 
30. See Beebe v. State, 6 Ind. 501 (1855); People v. Gallagher, 4 Mtch. 244 ( 1856); 
Wynehamer v. People, 13 N.Y. 378, 390-92 (1856) (Comstock, J.); id. at 411-13 (Johnson, 
J.); ld. at 430-433 (Selden, J.); State v. Peckham, 3 R.I. 289 (1838); Lincoln v. Smith. 27 Vt. 
328 (1855). Accord, T. SEDGWICK, A TREATISE ON THE RULES WHICH GOVERN THE IN-
TERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF STATUTORY AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 180-181 
(1857). 
31. See Nelson, Changing Conceptions of Judicial Review: The Evolution of Constitu-
tional Theorr in the States, 1790-1860, 120 U. PA. L. REv. 1166, 1180 (1972); Corwm, The 
Doctrineo/Due Process of Law Before the Civil War, 24 HARV. L. REV. 460.469-71 (1911). 
32. CoNG. GLOBE, 31st Cong., 1st Sess. App. 265 (1850). 
33. H. TREFOUSSE, BENJAMIN fRANKLIN WADE 36 (1963). 
34. D. DoNALD, supra note 9, at 146. 
35. CONG. GLOBE, 36th Cong., 2d Sess. App. 83 (1861). 
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nal principle of the Revolution" was that "the individual man, 
whether in or out of the social organization, . . . has certain rights 
which his fellow-man all over the globe is bound to respect."36 
While arguing a case, Chase gave perhaps the clearest exposition 
of these principles: 
The provisions of the constitution. contained in the amendments, like the 
provisions of the ordinance, contained in the articles of the compact, were mainly 
designed to establish as written law, certain great principles of natural right and 
justice, which exist independently of all such sanction. They rather announce 
restrictions upon legislative power, imposed by the very nature of society and of 
government, than create restrictions, which, were they erased from the constitu-
tion, the Legislature would be at liberty to disregard .... The Legislature can-
not authorize injustice by law; cannot nullify private contracts; cannot abrogate 
the securities of life. liberty and property, which it is the very object of society, as 
well as of our constitution of government, to provide; cannot make a man judge 
in his own case; cannot repeal the laws of nature; cannot create any obligation to 
do wrong, or neglect duty. No court is bound to enforce unjust law; but, on the 
contrary, every court is bound, by prior and superior obligations, to abstain from 
enforcing such law. It must be a clear case, doubtless, which will warrant a court 
in pronouncing a law so unjust that it ought not to be enforced; but, in a clear 
case, the path of duty is plain.37 
Similarly, John Hale argued that a New Hampshire jury was 
obliged to give no more effect to a law recognizing slavery than it 
would give a law recognizing ownership of moonbeams. 
For moderates like Abraham Lincoln, belief in natural law 
did not imply immunity from the duties imposed by positive law. 
For example, Lincoln maintained that if elected to Congress, it 
would be his duty to pass legislation enforcing the fugitive slave 
clause. For him, natural law was like the law of nations, intersti-
tial and capable of being displaced by positive law. 
Others took a sterner view of the commands of natural law. 
Of the fugitive slave law, Giddings said, "[l]et no man tell you that 
... there is no higher law than this fugitive slave bill," and he 
vowed to resist its enforcement.Js Giddings also thought slaves 
had the legal and moral right to use force to escape, going so far as 
to defend an uprising and murder by slaves aboard a slave ship. 
Ben Wade, later a leading radical Republican, was elected to the 
Senate on a platform of disobedience to the fugitive slave law.39 
These sentiments were not confined to Congressional debates. In 
Massachusetts, Ohio, and Wisconsin, there were notable instances 
36. /d., 1st Sess. 2514 (1860). 
37. W. PEASE & J. PEASE, THE ANTISLAVERY ARGUMENT 391-92 (1965). 
38. R. NYE, FETTERED FREEDOMS: CIVIL LIBERTIES AND THE SLAVERY CONTRO-
VERSY, 1830-1860, at 207 (1949). 
39. H. TREFOUSSE, THE RADICAL REPUBLICANS: LINCOLN'S VANGUARD FOR RA-
CIAL JUSTICE 53 ( !969). 
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of forcible resistance to the fugitive slave laws, sometimes with the 
support of the state courts. As Governor of New York, Seward 
refused to extradite individuals accused of helping slaves to es-
cape, reasoning that stealing slaves cannot be theft because no law 
can convert men into property. 
For many Republicans the "higher law" had a religious basis. 
For example, the Rockford Register said that the equality of man 
was "a truth not obvious to the senses, but one that is hidden in 
God, and revealed to those only who in all sincerity approach 
Him." It went on to say that the basis of human equality is that 
"when life is all derived from God, no one can have a claim to 
superiority over another."4o Lovejoy (brother of the abolitionist 
editor) expounded upon the biblical passage, "He that stealeth a 
man and selleth him, . . . he shall surely be put to death." Later 
in the same speech, Lovejoy admonished Southerners, "Instead of 
chattering your gibberish in my ear about negro equality, go look 
the Son of God in the face and reproach him with favoring negro 
equality because he poured out his blood for the most abject and 
despised of the human family."4t Giddings accused Southerners 
of authorizing the sale of Christ in the person of his followers.42 
He held to the view that "all human governments . . . are sub-
jected to the 'higher law' of the Creator, and authorized to legis-
late only for the protection of the rights which God has conferred 
on mankind."43 Because of these views, the Free Soil party's plat-
form proclaimed slavery a sin. For any Southerners who missed 
the message, Hamlin warned that "nations, like individuals, must 
answer to a higher power for the wrongs they perpetrate. "44 The 
religious beliefs of these men not only provided an intellectual 
foundation for their antislavery views, but also added an emo-
tional resonance that could hardly have been obtained by quoting 
Pufendorf or V attel. 
For many Republicans, however, the wellsprings of natural 
law were to be found with the founding fathers rather than the 
40. I H. PERKINS, NORTHERN EDITORIALS ON SECESSION 505, 506 (1942). See also 
id. at 488 (Dubuque Daily Times); id. at 481 (Springfield (Mass.) Daily Republican). 
41. CoNG. GLOBE, 35th Cong., 2d Sess. App. 197, 199 (1859). Despite his strongly 
anti-slavery stance, Lovejoy enjoyed a high degree of popularity in his district. See W. 
KING, LINCOLN'S MANAGER, DAVID DAVIS 113-14, 117-19 (1960). 
42. CoNG. GLOBE, 33rd Cong., 2d Sess. App. 33 (1854). 
43. CoNG. GLOBE, 35th Cong., 1st Sess. App. 65 (1858). Later in the same passage. 
he said that certain rights are "an element of the human soul; they cannot be alienated by 
the individual; nor can any association of men, or any earthly power, separate the humblest 
of the human race from them." /d. 
44. CoNG. GLOBE, 35th Cong., 1st Sess. 1003 (1858). See also id. at App. 95 (remarks 
of Rep. Clark). 
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biblical patriarchs.4s The Republicans went to great lengths to 
demonstrate the antislavery sentiments of the founding fathers. 46 
Much reliance was placed on Madison's opposition to the use of 
the word "slavery" in the Constitution, as showing that the Con-
stitution gave no sanction to slavery. Based on the statements of 
the framers, the Constitutional debates, and the Federalist papers, 
Seward stated the basic Republican position: "that the Constitu-
tion does not recognize property in man, but leaves that question, 
as between the States, to the law of nature and of nations. That 
law, as expounded by Vattel, is founded in the reason ofthings."47 
In two 1858 speeches, Hoard and Hale carefully catalogued anti-
slavery statements by Jefferson, Patrick Henry, and others.4s Also 
relying on Jefferson, a Connecticut newspaper stressed his state-
ment that he "trembled for his country when he remembered that 
God is just."49 Jefferson's role in excluding slavery from the 
Northwest territory was also cited, as well as a 1787 declaration 
that the Americans had fought for "the cause of human nature. "so 
Perhaps the most important source of antislavery Republi-
canism was the Declaration of Independence. Giddings and Ad-
ams both thought it part of the law of nations or American public 
law. Other Republicans drew lengthy parallels between the ac-
tions of the Slavocracy and the list of grievances in the Declara-
tion. Adherence to the Declaration became a kind of touchstone 
for Republicans. In its 1860 platform, the party officially affirmed 
its belief: 
That the maintenance of the principles promulgated in the Declaration of 
Independence and embodied in the Federal Constitution, "That all men are cre-
ated equal; that they are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights; 
that among these are life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness; that to secure these 
rights. governments are instituted among men, deriving their just powers from the 
consent of the governed," is essential to the preservation of our Republican insti-
tutions; and that the Federal Constitution, the Rights of the States, and the Union 
of the States must and shall be preserved. 51 
45. !d .. 34th Cong .. 1st Sess. App. 749 (1856). 
46. See td. at App. 1170-72 (1856) (Rep. Leiter); id. at 124 (Rep. Bingham); id. at 393-
94 (Sen. Wilson); id. at 1160-1163 (Rep. Cragin); id., 35th Cong .. 2d Sess. App. 197. 199 
(1859) (Rep. Lovejoy). 
47. !d .. 31st Cong., 1st Sess. App. 264 (1850). 
48. !d .. 35th Cong .. 1st Sess., App. 274 ( 1858); td. at 344. See also td. at 315 (remarks 
of Sen. Hale). 
49. I H. PERKINS, supra note 40, at 62. For other allusions to Jefferson's statement. 
see CoNG. GLOBE. 34th Cong .. 1st Sess. App. 750 (Sen. Wade); id. at 1203 (Rep. Gilbert); 
td. at 1161 (Rep. Cragin); td .. 35th Cong., 2d Sess. App. 197 (1850) (Rep. Lovejoy); id., 36th 
Con g .. 2d Sess. App. 82 ( 1861) (Rep. Bingham). 
50. CONG. GLOBE, 35th Cong .. 1st Sess. 1003 ( 1858) (Sen. Hamlin); td .. 34th Con g .. 
1st Sess. App. 404-05 (1856) (Sen. Seward). 
51. 2 A. SCHLESINGER, supra note 6, at 1239-40. 
250 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 1:235 
This provision was not boilerplate, but instead was adopted out of 
Parlimentary order when Giddings threatened a walk-out. 
This platform comported well with the candidate's views. 
Lincoln repeatedly stressed the Declaration in the Lincoln-Doug-
las debates. In one speech, for example, he said: 
I adhere to the Declaration of Independence. If Judge Douglas and his friends 
are not willing to stand by it, let them come up and amend it. Let them make it 
read that all men are created equal except negroes. Let us have it decided 
whether the Declaration of Independence, in this blessed year of 1858, shall be 
thus amended.52 
In another debate he argued that " [i]f [the] Declaration is not the 
truth, let us get the statute book, in which we find it, and tear it 
out. "s3 Lincoln used this attack on Douglas again and again in 
the debates, perhaps most powerfully in the following passage: 
I believe the entire records of the world, from the date of the Declaration of Inde-
pendence up to within three years ago, may be searched in vain for one single 
affirmation, from one single man, that the negro was not included in the Declara-
tion of Independence; I think I may defy Judge Douglas to show that he ever said 
so, that Washington ever said so, that any President ever said so, that any member 
of Congress ever said so, or that any living man upon the whole earth ever said so, 
until the necessities of the present policy of the Democratic party, in regard to 
slavery, had to invent that affirmation. And I will remind Judge Douglas and this 
audience that while Mr. Jefferson was the owner of slaves, as undoubtedly he was, 
in speaking upon this very subject he used the strong language that "he trembled 
for his country when he remembered that God was just"; and I will offer the 
highest premium in my power to Judge Douglas if he will show that he, in all his 
life, ever uttered a sentiment at all akin to that of Jefferson.54 
Lincoln's views are particularly significant. Because he belonged 
to the center of the party, he is considered "an ideal party leader 
to examine in order to measure the thinking of average 
Republicans."ss 
For Lincoln, as for many others, the most important aspect of 
the Declaration was its affirmation that "all men are created 
equal." This stress on equality permeates the speeches of both the 
Republican leadership and less prominent men. According to 
Seward, the United States was "founded in the natural equality of 
all men ... not made equal by human laws, but born equai."s6 
In his view, the central idea of the Republican Party was the 
"equality of all men before human tribunals and human laws,"57 
52. LINCOLN-DOUGLAS DEBATES, supra note I, (Part I) at 175. 
53. /d. at 64. 
54. !d. (Part II) at 13-114. 
55. K. STAMPP, supra note 2, at 123.; see also id. at 134 (Lincoln's position represents 
"the center of gravity" in the Republican Party). 
56. See R. NYE, supra note 38, at 184 (emphasis in original). 
57. E. FONER, supra note 4, at 38. 
1984] FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 251 
an idea he also thought as native to the Constitution as "the blood 
... is native to the heart."ss Sumner's passionate belief in legal 
equality led him to argue, over a century before Brown v. Board of 
Education, that school segregation violated "that fundamental 
right of all citizens, Equality before the Law," because it branded 
"a whole race with the stigma of inferiority."s9 
What the Republicans meant by equality was legal equality. 
Wilson praised his home state as "a commonwealth that throws 
over the poor, the weak, the lowly, upon whom misfortune has 
laid its iron hand, the protection of just and equallaws."60 Wade 
declared that he stood "upon the Declaration of Independence" in 
support of the idea that before the law all men are equa1.6t By 
equality, he apparently meant the qualified legal equality existing 
in the North.62 In a similar vein, Bingham said that the "Consti-
tution is based upon the EQUALITY of the human race." Bing-
ham saw in the Constitution several affirmations of the "equality 
and brotherhood of the human race."63 As Lincoln observed: 
I have said that I do not understand the Declaration to mean that all men 
were created equal in all respects. They are not our equal in color: but I suppose 
that it does mean to declare that all men are equal in some respects: they are 
equal in their right to ''life, liberty. and the pursuit of happiness." Certainly the 
negro is not our equal in color,-perhaps not in many other respects: still. in the 
right to put into his mouth the bread that his own hands have earned. he is the 
equal of every other man, white or black.64 
The Declaration of Independence rested on a view about the 
relationship between government and the people that many 
Republicans were willing to adopt. There was wide agreement 
among Republicans that governments derived their powers from 
the consent of the governed. They viewed the federal Constitu-
tion as a compact by the people rather than the states. Even on 
the eve of secession, Bingham conceded that the right of revolu-
tion was a "sacred and indefeasible" right, though he argued that 
the South had no just grounds for rebellion. He also opposed the 
proposed thirteenth amendment, which would have precluded fu-
58. CoNG. GLOBE. 31st Cong .. 1st Sess. App. 1023 (1850). In a somewhat similar 
vein. Rep. Leiter suggested that the drafters of the Declaration "submitted their principles 
to Almighty God. and received His righteous approval." /d .. 34th Cong .. 1st Sess. App. 
1171 ( 1856). 
59. Oral argument of Charles Sumner in Roberts v. Boston ( 1849). quoted in W. 
PEASE & J. PEASE. supra note 37, at 288. 
60. CoNG. GLOBE, 34th Cong .. 1st Sess. App. 393 ( 1856). 
61. /d. at App. 751. 
62. See, e.g .. H. TREFOUSE, supra note 33. at 87. 
63. CoNG. GLOBE. 34th Cong .. 3d Sess. App. 139. 140 (1857) (emphasis in original). 
64. LINCOLN-DOUGLAS DEBATES, supra note I. (Part I) at 176. See also id. (Pan II) 
at 115. 
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ture amendments on slavery, because it struck at the "inherent 
right of the people to alter or amend [the Constitution] at their 
pleasure. "65 Hale's belief in revolution found expression in praise 
for Cromwell and the regicides.66 Belief in popular self-rule did 
not, however, lead to a belief in unqualified majoritarianism. 
Giddings believed that governments are "authorized to legislate 
only for the protection of the rights which God has conferred on 
mankind."67 Bingham agreed that government's "primal object 
must be to protect each human being within its jurisdiction in the 
free and full enjoyment of his natural rights. "t>s 
What were these natural rights? The Republicans found it 
less necessary to address this question than to affirm that some 
such rights did exist. Nevertheless, there are some useful clues to 
their thinking on particular rights. In attempting to determine 
what rights were considered fundamental, we may look to a long 
period of Republican attacks on the South for denying a variety of 
human rights. It is also useful to examine the legal literature and 
cases of the period. 
Freedom of speech and religion were clearly among the fun-
damental rights recognized in the 1850's. Anticipating Alexander 
Meiklejohn, Kent stressed that free speech concerning govern-
mental officials is essential to the "control over their rulers, which 
resides in the free people of the United States." He also believed 
that "civil and religious liberty generally go hand in hand."69 
Rawle agreed that "[t]he foundation of a free government begins 
to be undermined when freedom of speech on political subjects is 
restrained"; when such rights are denied, "life is indeed of little 
value." As to religious freedom, he felt that the first amendment 
merely restated Congress's lack of power in the area, since no one 
could reasonably believe that "the general welfare of a nation 
could be promoted by religious intolerance."70 Similar views are 
expressed in the influential work of Francis Lieber. who also sup-
ported the right to petition and freedom of association. 7 1 
The Republicans stressed their agreement with these princi-
ples and criticized the South as an enemy of free speech. Gid-
65. CO!'G. GLOBE, 36th Cong., 2d Sess. App. 82 (1861). 
66. /d .. 35th Cong .• 1st Sess. 319 (1858). 
67. CONG. GLOBE, 35th Cong .. 1st Sess. App. 65 (1858) . . Set' tilro J. STEW-\RT. 
JOSHUA GiDDINGS AND THE TACTICS OF RADICAL POLITilS 171-172 11'176). 
68. !d .. 34th Cong .• 3d Sess .. App. 139 ( 1857). 
69. 2 J. KENT. supra note 14. at *17. 34-35. 
70. W. RAWLE, A VIEW OF THE CoNSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATicS 01 AM~.RI< .-\ 
121. 123 (1829). 
71. f. LiEBER. ON CiVIL LIBERTY AND SELF GOVER!'OME~T S'l-'1'1. 124-30. 275-82 
(1859). 
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dings attacked the South for keeping slaves ignorant and 
restricting freedom of speech in order to enslave the public mind. 
"No injury to the body," he said, could "bear any comparison to 
the enslavement of the intellect."n Lovejoy accused the South of 
a despotism like Napoleon's in crushing freedom of speech and 
the press.73 These assertions, echoed by other Republican leaders 
and by the press,74 had deep historical roots. The antislavery 
movement gained much of its strength from Northern reaction to 
Southern attempts to limit first amendment rightsJs 
The Kansas controversy in the late 1850's provided an impor-
tant occasion for expression of civil liberties views. 76 The pro-
slavery LeCompton government attempted to suppress antislavery 
speech. Its attempts to do so were bitterly attacked by the Repub-
licans. Wilson accused the LeCompton government of striking 
down free speech, imposing "[t)est oaths, against which reason 
and humanity revolt," and reducing the people of Kansas "to the 
pitiable condition of conquered menials of the slave power."77 
Seward accused the Kansas legislature of making it "a crime to 
think what one pleased, and to write and print what one thought," 
thereby borrowing "all the enginery of tyranny, but the torture, 
from the practice of the Stuarts."7s "Before you hold this enact-
ment to be law," Bingham proclaimed, "burn our immortal Dec-
laration and our free-written Constitution, fetter our free press, 
and . . . put out the light of that understanding which the breath 
of the Almighty hath kindled."79 
Besides first amendment rights, property rights were also ap-
parently considered fundamental. Protection of property was an 
important part of early nineteenth century legal thought. Kent 
viewed property as one of the"natural, inherent and unalienable" 
72. CONG. GLOBE, 35th Cong .. 1st Sess. App. 66 (1858). 
73. /d., 2d Sess .. App. 197 (1859). 
74. See I H. PERKINS. supra note 40, at 77, 508-09 (editorials by the Chicago Dailr 
Democrat); CONG. GLOBE. 31st Cong .. 1st Sess .. App. 268 (1850) (remarks of Sen. Seward); 
id .. 34th Con g .. 1st Sess. App. 751 (1856) (remarks of Sen. Wade): id., 34th Cong., 3rd Sess. 
App. 91 (1856) (remarks of Rep. Cumback). 
75. R. NYE. supra note 38. at 40-69: 106-14, 119-20, 137-38. Note that the slogan of 
the Free Soil party was "Free Soil, Free Labor, Free Speech, Free Men." J. MAYFIELD. 
supra note 3, at 119 (emphasis added). 
76. The 1856 Republican platform [reprinted in 2 A. ScHLESINGER, supra, note 6, at 
1203-1205 (1973 )] charged that citizens of Kansas had been subjected to test oaths. denied 
their right to a speedy trial, their right to be free from unreasonable searches, and their 
rights to freedom of speech and of the press. 
77. CoNG. GLOBE. 34th Cong .. 1st Sess. App. 854 (1856). 
78. !d., 35th Cong .. 1st Sess. 941 ( 1858). Similar statements were made by Hale. Jd. at 
317. 
79. /d .. 34th Cong .. 1st Sess .. App. 124 (1856). 
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rights.so Sedgwick argued that legislation destroying vested rights 
in land would violate the just compensation clause, the due pro-
cess clause, and inherent limits on the legislative power. Lieber 
viewed the unrestricted freedom to acquire and produce property 
as an important fundamental right. This view of the sanctity of 
property was shared by many Republicans. Like several other 
Republicans, Fessenden argued that the true "foundation of the 
law of property" was divine.st Tappan said slaves were not held 
on "the same ground of natural right" as that by which other 
property was held.s2 One of the objections to slavery stressed by 
Lincoln and others was that it deprived slaves of the right to the 
fruits of their labor.s3 For these reasons, property can plausibly be 
viewed as a fundamental right. 
It is less clear whether the due process clause was thought to 
provide substantive protection for property. Many state courts re-
jected substantive due process, the most notable exception being 
New York's highest court.s4 On the other hand, the 1860 Republi-
can platform adopted the view that the due process clause prohib-
ited Congress from imposing slavery in the territories. This view 
of due process, which obviously went beyond the merely proce-
dural, was strongly endorsed by Bingham.ss Having imported at 
least some substantive content into the clause, the Republicans 
might have been willing to find protection for other fundamental 
rights in the same place. The evidence is inconclusive. 
It is not easy to tell which rights were considered fundamen-
80. See 2 J. KENT, supra note 14, at •t. 
81. CoNG. GLOBE, 35th Cong .. 1st Sess. App. llO (1858). 
82. /d. at App. 329 ( 1858). 
83. In one notable passage. Lincoln said that slavery rested on the same principle as 
"the divine right of kings": 
It is the same spirit that says. "You work and toil and earn bread. and I'll eat it." 
No matter in what shape it comes, whether from the mouth of a king who seeks to 
bestride the people of his own nation and live by the fruit of their labor. or from 
one race of men as an apology for enslaving another race. it is the same tyrannical 
principle. 
LINCOLN-DOUGLAS DEBATES supra note I. (Part II) at 268. 
84. The cases are reviewed at length in Corwin. supra note 31 at 366. 460 ( 1911). It 
should be noted that some of the cases Corwin discusses are from states such as Rhode 
Island in which the language of the state due process clause limited the clause to criminal 
cases. Many of the cases also contain fascinating discussions of procedural due process. 
85. See, e.g .• CoNG. GLOBE, 34th Cong .. 1st Sess. App. 124 (1856) (remarks of Rep. 
Bingham). Dean Ely suggests that such references to due process may have meant only the 
absence of adequate procedures. See Ely, Constitutional/nterpretivism: Its Allure and lm-
poSSiblfitr. 53 IND. L.J. 399,417 n.76 (1978). The 1860 platform calls for legislation prohib-
iting slavery as the necessary enforcement of the due process clause. and this seems hard to 
derive from a purely procedural view of due process. which would seem only to require 
that individuals be given hearings to confirm their putative owner's title. See 2 A. ScHLES-
INGER, supra note 6, at 1240-1241. 
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tal or the degree to which those rights could be regulated. Free 
speech and property rights seem to be the clearest candidates for 
inclusion on a Republican list of fundamental rights. Because so 
much attention was devoted to slavery, and because slaves had 
essentially no rights at all, the Republicans had little reason to 
specify the precise contour of natural rights. 
II 
The Republican effort to establish a posiUve law basis for 
fundamental rights began with the thirteenth amendment, which 
eliminated the discrepancy between the natural right of personal 
freedom and positive laws establishing slavery. In the Civil 
Rights Act, they turned to the problem of providing statutory pro-
tection for the rights of the freed slaves. Finally, in the fourteenth 
amendment, they sought to constitutionalize the higher law. 
A 
Lincoln's conciliatory inaugural address endorsed the pro-
posed thirteenth amendment, which would have guaranteed the 
legality of slavery in the states. But he also took the position that 
the Union was perpetual and that secession was unconstitutional. 
When the Confederates opened fire on Fort Sumter, the 
North could hardly have been less well prepared for war. It had 
virtually no army; it lacked a modern fiscal system with which to 
finance the war; it had no real bureaucracy with which to organize 
the war effort. Worse, the President had no clear authority to do 
anything at all about secession, let alone take the drastic actions 
required by the situation. Nevertheless, Lincoln did take decisive 
action. He proclaimed a blockade of Southern ports, dispersed 
funds to anti-secessionists without legal authorization, suspended 
the writ of habeas corpus, and hastily mustered an army consist-
ing of volunteers and state militias. Slowly, as Allan Nevins put 
it, the North lurched to arms. 
Lincoln also faced monumental political problems. Northern 
Democrats were at best unenthusiastic about the War. The border 
states, which had to be held if the Union was to survive, had 
strong leanings toward the South and slavery. While attempting 
to pacify them, Lincoln also had to maintain the support of his 
own party, which contained strong antislavery forces. The party 
itself was less than a decade old and had never before held na-
tional power. So Lincoln had to fight a war, mold a political 
party, and create the machinery of wartime government all 
concurrently. 
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The relatively even position of the two parties, combined 
with the need to keep the loyalty of the border states, required 
Lincoln to take a cautious position on slavery. His position was 
supported by those politicians who were tied to his administration 
by patronage and by other political realists. To the antislavery 
wing of the party, the pro-administration wing seemed conserva-
tive. According to recent historians, however, the pro-administra-
tion wing shared the antislavery ideology but was more cautious 
about tactics. During the early stages of the conflict, these con-
servative and moderate Republicans joined with Democrats in 
disavowing abolition as a Northern war aim.s6 
Inevitably, however, Republicans came to view emancipation 
as necessary to preserve the Union.s7 Emancipation began with 
sporadic, unauthorized actions by army officers. In 1862, Con-
gress took timid steps forward with the Confiscation Act, which 
provided for the seizure of rebel property including slaves, and 
with legislation abolishing slavery in the Territories and the Dis-
trict of Columbia. On September 22, 1862, Lincoln issued a pre-
liminary proclamation, which he made final in the Emancipation 
Proclamation on January 1, 1863. Lincoln was apparently moti-
vated by a combination of tactical considerations and his long-
standing antislavery beliefs. The Proclamation applied only in the 
Confederacy, not in the border states. 
By mid-1863, Republicans were ready to end slavery. No 
longer did they disavow abolition as an independent objective of 
the War.ss In their minds, slavery and rebellion had become 
one.s9 Only a constitutional amendment permanently abolishing 
slavery could ensure the security of the Union.9o 
The thirteenth amendment prohibits slavery and "involun-
tary servitude," in language drawn from the Northwest Ordinance 
of 1787. The amendment was debated in both Houses of Con-
gress in the spring of 1864. It passed the Senate easily but failed 
86. See J. McPHERSON, THE STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY 70-71 (1964); H. BEl.Z, RE-
CONSTRUCTING THE UNION 24-27 (1969); THE RADICAl. REPUBLICANS AND RECONSTRUC-
TIOI', 1861-1870, at 7 (H. Hyman ed. 1967). 
87. H. BELZ, A NEW BIRTH OF fREEDOM: THE REPUBLICAN PARTY AND FREED-
MEI''S RIGHTS, 1861-1866, at 3, 49-50 (1976). 
88. J. McPHERSON, "The Ballot and Land for the freedmen," in RECONSTRUCTION: 
AN ANTHOLOGY OF REVISIONIST WRITINGS 132 (K. Stampp & L. Litwack, eds. 1969). 
89. See CoNG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 1201 (1864) (remarks of Rep. Wilson): id. 
at 2948 (remarks of Rep. Shannon); id. at 2988 (remarks of Rep. Arnold); rd. at 1313 (re-
marks of Sen. Trumbull); id. at 1321 (remarks of Sen. Wilson); id. at 1461 (remarks of Sen. 
Henderson); id. at 2615 (remarks of Rep. Morris). 
90. As Senator Trumbull noted, slaves could be emancipated under the war power. 
but slavery could only be abolished permanently by means of a constitutional amendment. 
See CONG. GLOBE. 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 1314 (1864). 
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to obtain a two-thirds majority in the House. It then became an 
issue in the presidential campaign of 1864, with Lincoln vigor-
ously backing the amendment. After Lincoln's victory, the 
amendment passed in the next session of the House. 
The debates on the amendment reveal the continuity of anti-
slavery thought. As before the war, the slave power theory played 
a major part in the opposition to slavery. In opening the Senate 
debate, Trumbull attributed all the Union's problems to the fail-
ure of slavery to disappear as the framers had expected and to the 
Slavocracy's demand for control of the nation.9t Wilson too em-
phasized the expansionism of the slave power, which had aggres-
sively sought to extend slavery into the territories.n 
Like the pre-war antislavery Republicans, members of the 
Thirty-eighth Congress stressed the impact of slavery on the rights 
of non-slaves. As Trumbull noted in his introductory remarks, 
slavery had brought about a denial of freedom of speech and the 
press in half the Union.93 Senator Wilson cataloged the evils that 
slavery had caused: violent attacks on abolitionists, gag orders in 
Congress, seizure of colored seamen in the South, and assaults on 
those who attempted to defend them.94 
Once again, Republicans invoked the Declaration of Inde-
pendence. Listen to Reverdy Johnson, a clear-headed constitu-
tional lawyer not normally given to flights of rhetoric: 
We mean that the Governmeut in future shall be as it has been in the past .... an 
example of human freedom for the light and example of the world. and illustrat-
ing in the blessings and the happiness it confers the truth of the principles incor-
porated into the Declaration of Independence, that life and liberty are man's 
inalienable right95 
Trumbull, another down-to-earth moderate with little penchant 
for rhetoric, noted the inconsistency between the Declaration, 
which proclaimed "the equal rights of all to life, liberty, and hap-
piness," and the denial of "liberty, happiness, and life itself to a 
91. !d. at 1313 (1864). 
92. /d. at 1320. Similar views were stated in the House. !d. at 2979 (remarks of Rep. 
Farnsworth): 1d. at 1368 (remarks of Sen. Clark): CoNG. GLOBE, 38th Cong .. 2d Sess. 138 
( 1865) (remarks of Rep. Ashley) ("irrepressible conflict"). 
93. CONG. GLOBE. 38th Cong .. 1st Sess. 1313 (1864). 
94. /d. at 1320-21. In the House. see 1d. at 2978-79 (remarks of Rep. Farnsworth): id. 
at 2984 (remarks of Rep. Kelley); id. at 2990 (remarks of Rep. Ingersoll): CoNG. GLOBE. 
38th Cong., 2d Sess. 138, 143 ( 1845), (remarks of Rep. Orth). To the same effect, see 1d .. 1st 
Sess. 1439 (remarks of Sen. Harlan). 
95. !d. at 1424. Other references to the Declaration can be found in Sen. Henderson's 
remarks. 1d. at 1461: in Sen. Sumner's remarks. Jd. at 1482-1483: and in Rep. Orth's re-
marks. id., 2d Sess. 142-143 ( 1865 ). 
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whole race."96 
There were also more direct appeals to the higher law. Rep-
resentative Ingersoll, for example, favored the amendment 
because it will secure to the oppressed slave his natural and God-given rights. I 
believe that the black man has certain inalienable rights. . . . I believe he has a 
right to live, and live in a state of freedom. . . . He has a right to till the soil. to 
earn his bread by the sweat of his brow, and enjoy the rewards of his own labor. 
He has a right to the endearments and enjoyment of family ties.97 
Another legislator maintained that no "constitution can legalize 
the enslavement of men."9s A third argued that 
the municipal act upon which the right to property in man is predicated is in 
contravention to the law of natural justice, and cannot establish a claim which 
'white men are bound to respect.' Theft and robbery. though sanctioned by legis-
lative authority. cannot absolve man from his allegiance to that law which is 
supreme and infallible. 
He denied "that any assembly of human law-makers ever pos-
sessed the power to create a right of property in man which we, as 
men, or citizens of the Republic, are bound to respect. "99 
The longest discussions of natural law came in response to 
arguments made by opponents to the amendment. Some oppo-
nents argued that the amendment clause of the Constitution did 
not extend to slavery. For example, one opponent argued that the 
proposed amendment struck at property, which the government 
lacked the right to destroy. Abolition of slavery, he claimed, 
would violate the natural law of property.wo 
A few of the amendment's supporters answered that the 
amendment's power was simply not limited by natural law. 101 But 
the more common response was that the amendment did not de-
stroy a vested property right because slavery itself violated natural 
law.1o2 One supporter argued that God gave man no right to 
property in man, only in things. Another contended that property 
in slaves "exists only by the laws of the States" in which it is 
found, but "has no warrant in nature; it finds no sanctions in the 
enumeration of the subject of property over which dominion was 
given to man by the Creator. . . . [l]ts origin is human and not 
96. !d .. lst Sess. 1313 (1864). 
97. /d. at 2990 (remarks of Rep. Ingersoll). 
98. /d .. 2d Sess. 138 (1865). For other general references to natural law. see id. at 
142-43 (remarks of Rep. Orth), id. at 154-55 (remarks of Rep. Davis). 
99. /d. at 484. 
100. /d .. lst Sess. 2940-41 ( 1864). See also id. at 2952 (remarks of Rep. Coffroath): id .. 
2d Sess. 151 (remarks of Rep. Rogers). 
101. See id .. lst Sess. 2943 (1864) (remarks of Rep. Higby): id. at 2980 (remarks of 
Rep. Thayer). 
102. /d. at 2978. 
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divine."I03 
The amendment's opponents also taunted Republicans with 
the question whether the Constitution could be amended to estab-
lish slavery in free states.I04 This drew heated responses. Repre-
sentative Broomall gave this answer: 
[T]here are some things that are not within the limits of human legislation. It is 
not within the limits of human laws to legislate away the soul of man; we cannot 
deprive him, by any process of legislation, constitutional or otherwise, of his free 
agency; we cannot legislate away his liberty. No man can sell himself. Hence no 
man can empower his Government to sell him. lOS 
A colleague admitted that such an amendment would be a law 
but, being "opposed to the inalienable rights of the people of the 
United States," it would be "if I may use a contradictory expres-
sion, an unlawful law, a law which you could not enforce, a law 
contravening the inalienable rights of the citizens of this coun-
try." 106 To the same effect, others said that it would violate the 
higher law, and, as one put it, "any human law that conflicts with 
the laws of God should be pronounced of no binding force by our 
courts." 101 
These debates reveal the continued adherence of large seg-
ments of the Republican party to higher law doctrines. They 
viewed slavery as a violation of fundamental rights, which at last 
they had the power to correct through positive legislation. Obvi-
ously they hoped that after abolition of slavery these fundamental 
rights would no longer be suppressed. Events were to show, how-
ever, that abolition did not suffice to bring true freedom for 
blacks. Congress was then faced with providing protection for the 
fundamental rights whose existence they had already recognized. 
B 
Reconstruction began when the army found it necessary to 
govern conquered areas in the South. In December, 1863, Lincoln 
established a procedure for Southern states to reenter the Union. 
New state governments would be organized when ten percent of 
the voters had taken a loyalty oath and adopted a state constitu-
tion renouncing secession and accepting emancipation. Congress 
103. CoNG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 2d Sess. 484 (1865) (Rep. Smithers); id at 217. A 
similar natural law view of property was expressed by Senator Harlan. See id., 1st Sess. 
1437 (1864). 
104. See, e.g., id., 2d Sess. 222 (1865) (remarks of Rep. Pendleton). 
105. !d. at 220 (1865). 
106. /d. at 222. (remarks of Rep. Thayer). 
107. /d. at 486. 
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would retain only the power to decide when to seat Southern 
representatives. 
Congress responded with the Wade-Davis Bill, in which it 
attempted to gain greater control of reconstruction. The bill re-
quired more stringent loyalty oaths and placed additional restric-
tions on the new state constitutions as a condition on 
representation in Congress. Although Lincoln pocket-vetoed the 
bill, Congress continued to assert its authority in reconstruction 
matters. It created the Freedmen's Bureau to provide protection 
for blacks and other refugees in the South, and declined to seat 
representatives of the Banks government in Louisiana. 
When the war ended, Republicans were confident that resto-
ration of the Southern states could be achieved without any na-
tional guarantees other than the thirteenth amendment. Even the 
assassination of Lincoln did not immediately dim their optimism. 
For when Andrew Johnson assumed office he was not viewed as 
an implacable foe of the Congressional Republicans.1os 
When Johnson announced his reconstruction plan, however, 
it became clear that he would take an extremely conservative posi-
tion. The Republican euphoria of the immediate postwar period 
began to wane with the implementation of Johnson's program. 
The governments created under the plan were dominated by lead-
ing rebels. 
Even more disturbing were the widely publicized reports of 
the proposed Southern black codes. These codes prohibited 
blacks from renting land, provided for the seizure of those who 
breached labor contracts, prohibited servants from leaving their 
masters' premises, and authorized the hiring out of black children 
and of blacks unable to pay vagrancy fines. The codes also made 
certain conduct criminal only when done by blacks. Republicans 
considered the codes attempts to deprive the North of the fruits of 
victory by reimposing slavery in a more subtle form. Republicans 
now believed that additional guarantees were needed. 
When the Thirty-ninth Congress convened, the moderate 
Republicans who were in control immediately began to devise a 
reconstruction plan that they thought would be acceptable to 
Johnson and the public. Congress established a Joint Committee 
on Reconstruction to coordinate consideration of the issue. The 
most immediate fruit of the Republican consensus regarding the 
108. Indeed, at that time, even the radical wing of the Party appears to have viewed 
him as an ally. SeeK. STAMPP, ERA OF RECONSTRUCTION (1965); M. BENEDICT, A CoM-
PROMISE OF PRINCIPLE: CONGRESSIONAL REPUBLICANS AND RECONSTRUCTION, 1863-
!869, at 219-20 (1974). 
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need for federal protection of blacks and loyal Southern whites 
was passage of the second Freedmen's Bureau Bill and the Civil 
Rights Bill. The primary purpose of the Freedmen's Bureau Bill 
was to extend the bureau's life. It also made some attempt to pro-
vide land for the freedmen as well as protection for their civil 
rights. 
President Johnson shocked moderates with his veto of the 
Freedmen's Bureau Bill. His veto message denied Congress's 
power to pass any such bill in peacetime and seemed to indicate 
that peace had arrived. Congressional moderates were now under 
intense pressure to take some action to get reconstruction moving 
again. Their response was to push through the Civil Rights 
Bill.109 
When the Civil Rights Bill first came up for debate, section I 
contained four provisions. First, blacks were declared to be citi-
zens of the United States. Second, the bill prohibited "discrimina-
tion in civil rights or immunities among the inhabitants of any 
State or territory" on account of race. Third, all inhabitants were 
to have the same rights to contract, to sue, and to engage in vari-
ous real estate and personal property transactions. Fourth, all in-
habitants were to have "full and equal benefit of all laws and 
proceedings for the security of person and property" and were to 
be subject to the same punishments.Iw As amended, the bill 
passed the Senate on February 2, 1866. 
The most important subsequent change took place at the ini-
tiative of Representative Bingham. On March 8, he moved to 
have the general prohibition on "discrimination in civil rights or 
immunities" struck from the bill. He believed that Congress 
lacked power to pass the bill. His proposed changes would leave 
the bill invalid but make it "less objectionable." Essentially, his 
argument was that the term "civil rights" was too vague. 111 On 
March 13, when the House resumed consideration of the bill, 
Representative Wilson agreed on behalf of the committee to strike 
the general no-discrimination clause. He explained that the 
change did not materially affect the bill, but "some gentlemen 
were apprehensive that the words we propose to strike out might 
give warrant for a latitudinarian construction not intended." 112 
The committee had previously made several other amendments, 
109. On these events, see M. BENEDICT, supra note 108, at 155-56, 162. 
I 10. /d. at 148. 
Ill. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1291 (1866). 
112. /d. at 1366. 
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the most important of which was to limit the bill's protections to 
citizens. 
President Johnson vetoed the Civil Rights Bill, contending 
that it invaded the exclusive jurisdiction of the states.ID Although 
Johnson had retained some party support after vetoing the Freed-
men's Bureau Bill, the reaction was far more severe when he ve-
toed the Civil Rights Bill. In a mood of great emotionalism, 
Congress overrode the veto. 
The debates over the Civil Rights Bill and the Freedman's 
Bureau Bill are couched in different terms from the earlier argu-
ments about the thirteenth amendment. While many Republicans 
observed that the bills were designed to protect natural rights be-
longing to all human beings, they more often referred to these 
rights as belonging to United States citizens. 114 Republicans con-
tinued to believe that all men possessed natural rights. But they 
had always distinguished between whether a state was violating 
natural law and whether the federal government had the power to 
do anything about it. In adopting the Civil Rights Bill, what 
Republicans needed was not a source of human rights, but a justi-
fication for federal intervention to protect those rights against 
state abridgement.IIS Many cited the thirteenth amendment, on 
the theory that the rights set forth in the bill were inherent in the 
freedom guaranteed by the amendment. 116 Opponents replied 
that the thirteenth amendment only authorized Congress to abol-
ish slavery.111 In turn, the Republicans responded by arguing that 
113. /d. at 1679. 
114. References to natural rights can, however, still be found in the debates. See. e.g .. 
CoN G. GLOBE. 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 474-76 ( 1866) (remarks of Sen. Trumbull); Jd. at 1124 
(remarks of Rep. Cook); id. at 1159 (remarks of Rep. Windom); td. at 1157 (remarks of 
Rep. Thornton); id. at 1832-33 (remarks of Rep. Lawrence); td. at 632 (remarks of Rep. 
Moulton); id. at 744 (remarks of Sen. Sherman). 
Some two years later, Congress considered a bill relating to expatriation. The legisla-
tive history is replete with natural law references. See CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong .• 2d Sess. 
968. 1130 ( 1868) (remarks of Rep. Butler); Jd. at 969 (remarks of Rep. Judd); td. at 1100-0 I. 
1159 (remarks of Rep. Baker); id. at 1101 (remarks of Rep. Ashley); id. at 1105 (remarks of 
Rep. Clarke); id. at 1130-31 (remarks of Rep. Woodbridge); id. at 1797-1798, 2316 (remarks 
of Rep. Banks); id. at 1797 (preamble of bill: "right of expatriation is a natural and inher-
ent right of all people"); id. at 1800-1804 (remarks of Rep. Van Trump); id. at 4211 (re-
marks of Sen. Howard); td. at 4233-4234 (remarks of Sen. Morton). 
115. The Freedmen's Bureau Bill could be justified as an exercise of the war power. 
As Belz says, the controversies in passing the Civil Rights Act were not over the content of 
rights. which Republicans agreed on. but over whether rights should be protected by the 
state or federal government. See H. BELZ, supra note 87, at 162, 166 (note that Belz's list of 
rights includes the family and religion). 
116. See, e.g .• CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 41 (1866) (remarks of Sen. Sher-
man); id. at 39 (remarks of Sen. Wilson); id. at 475 (remarks of Sen. Trumbull); td. at 1124 
(remarks of Rep. Cook); id. at 1152 (remarks of Rep. Thayer). 
117. Whether the thirteenth amendment in fact provided authority to pass the Civil 
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all governments have the duty, and therefore the inherent power, 
to protect the fundamental rights of their citizens. 
In considering this arguments, it is important to keep in mind 
the changes the Civil War had made in constitutional thinking. 
The Constitution, after all, said nothing about secession, or about 
waging civil war, or about reconstructing a defeated South. Strict 
constructionists believed that the North was puwerless to do any 
of these things.JIB But fortunately, the Republicans were not strict 
constructionists. During the war they had come to believe that the 
national government's powers were congruent with the nation's 
needs.ll9 The Civil War had called for unprecedented actions by 
the President and Congress. By the end of the war, Republicans 
were accustomed to being able to find some source of constitu-
tional authority for whatever actions they thought necessary. 
The Civil War also drastically changed prevailing views 
about the relationship between the individual citizen and the na-
tional government. Before the war, the states were primarily re-
sponsible for meeting the basic needs of American citizens, while 
the national government had little impact on the daily lives of 
most Americans. Consequently, state citizenship was considered 
paramount. From this premise, it was a small step to the conclu-
sion that allegiance to the state came before allegiance to the fed-
eral government. But such concepts obviously could not survive 
the Civil War, a war for the primary allegiance of the citizen.12o 
Both the expansion of national power and the growing signif-
icance of national allegiance became evident early in the war. In 
the Prize Cases,121 the Supreme Court was required to determine 
Rights Bill is a much mooted question. It does appear that Republicans optimistically 
believed that the abolition of slavery would bring about a state of freedom for blacks. 
118. See D. POTTER, THE IMPENDING CRISIS, 1848-1861. 520 (1976). If he had been 
on the scene, Raoul Berger presumably would have taken this position. Berger argues that 
limits on the states can be imposed only if there is a "clear showing" of a specific intention 
in the Constitution, see, e.g .. R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY 17-18. 137 n.l7 
(1977), and he generally believes that the Constitution should be limited strictly by its 
framers' specific intent. SeeR. BERGER, DEATH PENALTIES 27-28; 77-79, 89, 102 n.ll7 
(1982). Since the Constitution nowhere expressly prohibits a state from seceding and no-
where expressly authorizes the federal government to resist secession, Berger seems logi-
cally committed to the position that the North wrongfully fought the Civil War. 
119. As Fessenden said about the Freedmen's Bureau bill, "the power may be found 
when the positive necessity of the thing is apparent." CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong .. 1st Sess. 
366 (1866). This theme was prevalent throughout the war. For examples during debates 
over the Confiscation Act of 1862, see CoNG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 2d Sess. 2293 (1862) 
(remarks of Rep. Wallace); id. at 1075 (remarks of Sen. Morrill). 
120. See Benedict, Preserving Federalism: Reconstruction and the Waite Court, 1978 
SUP. CT. REV. 39, 41; J. KETTNER, THE DEVELOPMENT OF AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP: 1608-
!870, at 334-42 (1978). 
121. 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635 (1862). The quoted passages are found in id. at 669, 674 
and 673, respectively. 
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not only the president's power to impose a blockade, but also the 
relationship of Southerners to the federal government after the 
outbreak of war. The Court strongly affirmed presidential power 
to react to the emergency without waiting for congressional ap-
proval or a declaration of war. When war broke out, "[t]he Presi-
dent was bound to meet it in the shape it presented itself, without 
waiting for Congress to baptize it with a name; and no name given 
to it by him or them could change the fact." As to the status of 
citizens in the South, the Court said, "[t]hey have cast off their 
allegiance and made war on their Government, and are none the 
less enemies because they are traitors." In an affirmation of na-
tionalism, the Court also said that citizens owe "supreme alle-
giance" to the federal government and only "qualified allegiance" 
to their state. 
Congress was also greatly concerned about questions of citi-
zenship and allegiance. The 1862 Confiscation Act provided a 
new punishment for treason and created the lesser crime of giving 
aid to the rebellion. Throughout the debates Republicans charac-
terized the rebels as traitors who could be punished for their "bro-
ken allegiance." One senator noted that the leading rebels, 
"having betrayed, are no further entitled to the protection of the 
Government"; another said that only "those who were true to 
their allegiance" were entitled to property rights.122 The impor-
tance attached to citizenship and allegiance is also evidenced by 
the frequent resort to loyalty oaths, particularly in the Confisca-
tion Act and the Wade-Davis Bill. The Wade-Davis Bill also 
stripped certain classes of Confederate office-holders of their 
United States citizenship. Finally, Congress itself provided that 
Southern congressmen-elect would have to take an iron-clad oath 
of past loyalty to the Union. 
Given the emotional significance of allegiance and the expan-
sion of national power during the war, it is not surprising that 
Republicans used the concept of national citizenship to justify 
their support of the Civil Rights Bill. They had little difficulty 
connecting the natural rights they sought to protect with national 
citizenship. Indeed, they argued that the comity clause in the 
original Constitution had already established this connection. Ar-
ticle IV, section 2 provides that "the citizens of each State shall be 
entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of citizens in the several 
States." Republicans interpreted the clause as if it said, "the citi-
122. CoNG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 2d Sess. 2299 (1862) (remarks of Rep. Blair); id. at 
1077; id. at 1881. 
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zens of each state shall be entitled to all the privileges and immu-
nities of citizens [of the United States] in the several states." 
They found support for this reading in some pre-Civil War 
cases, notably Coifield v. Corye/1.123 In Coifield, Justice Washing-
ton had said that the comity clause protects "those privileges and 
immunities which are, in their nature, fundamental; which belong, 
of right, to the citizens of all free governments; and which have, at 
all times, been enjoyed by the citizens of the several states .... " 
Among these rights were "[p]rotection by the goverment; the en-
joyment of life and liberty, with the right to acquire and possess 
property of every kind, and to pursue and obtain happiness and 
safety; subject nevertheless to such restraints as the government 
may justly prescribe for the general good of the whole." 
There are several examples of this interpretation of the com-
ity clause in the debates on the thirteenth amendment, 124 and it 
also figured prominently in the debates on the Civil Rights Bill. 
Senator Trumbull referred to the comity clause to demonstrate 
that 
the rights of a citizen of the United States were certain great fundamental rights, 
such as the right to life, to liberty, and to avail one's self of all the laws passed for 
the benefit of the citizen to enable him to enforce his rights; inasmuch as this was 
the definition given to the term as applied in that part of the Constitution, I rea-
soned from that, that when the Constitution had been amended and slavery abol-
ished. and we were about to pass a law declaring every person, no matter of what 
color, born in the United States a citizen of the United States, the same rights 
would then appertain to all persons who were clothed with American 
citizenship. 1 2 5 
In the House, Representative Wilson argued that the rights pro-
tected in the bill were not new because they were already con-
tained in the comity clause as construed in Coifield. That clause 
represented a "general citizenship" which "entitles every citizen to 
security and protection of personal rights." He argued that the 
bill protected rights belonging to "citizens of the United States, as 
123. 6 Fed. Cas. 546 551-552, (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) No. 3,230;seea/so Douglas v. Ste-
phens, I Del. Ch. 465,469-74,477-78 (1821); J. KETTNER, supra note 120, at 258-260.323, 
348. Corjield is close to the Supreme Court's current view of the comity clause, which also 
uses a fundamental rights analysis. See Hicklin v. Orbeck, 437 U.S. 518 (1978); Baldwin v. 
Fish & Game Comm'n, 436 U.S. 371 (1978); J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & N. YOUNG, CON-
STITUTIONAL LAW 300-06 (2d ed. 1983). 
124. See CoNG. GLOBE, 38th Cong .. 1st Sess. 1202 (1864) (remarks of Rep. Wilson) 
(right of free speech belongs to every American citizen and is protected by the comity 
clause); id., 2d Sess. 139 (1865) (remarks of Rep. Ashley). Prominent Republicans had 
relied on the comity clause as a grant of rights of national citizenship even earlier. See H. 
BELZ. supra note 87, at 27-29, 119-20, 164-65. 
125. CoNG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 600 (1866). See also id. at 476 (bill protects 
"fundamental rights belonging to every man as a free man"). Trumbull used somewhat 
similar language in connection with the Freedman's Bureau Bill. See id. at 319, 322. 
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such."126 Representative Lawrence responded to the President's 
veto with a lengthy defense of the bill. He maintained that Con-
gress had the power to secure citizens "in the enjoyment of their 
inherent right of life, liberty, and property," and "to enforce [the 
comity clause] and the equal civil rights which it recognizes or by 
implication affirms to exist among citizens of the same State." Af-
ter a discussion of some of the cases and writers dealing with the 
comity clause, he concluded that it embodies "equal fundamental 
civil rights for all citizens." m 
Another concept also played an important role in the debates. 
Natural law and law-of-nations thinkers had stressed that citizens 
owe allegiance to their government in exchange for the govern-
ment's grant of protection to them. Thus, one of the most impor-
tant rights of citizenship is the right to receive such protection. 
Early in the debates on the Civil Rights Act, Senator Johnson 
raised this argument: 
If I am right . . . that we can authorize (blacks] to sue, authorize them to contract, 
authorize them to do everything short of voting, it is not because there is anything 
in the Constitution of the United States that confers the authority to give to a 
negro the right to contract, but it is because it is a necessary, incidental function of 
a Government that it should have authority to provide that the rights of every-
body within its limits shall be protected, and protected alike. t28 
He concluded that it "would have been a disgrace to the members 
of the [Constitutional] Convention" if they had foreseen the aboli-
tion of slavery and "had denied to the Congress of the United 
States the authority to pass laws for the protection of all the rights 
incident to the condition of a free man." 
A similar argument was made in the House by Representa-
tive Broomall. He first noted that it was a "strange" view that the 
government could protect its citizens abroad but not at home. He 
found such a power in the general welfare clause and in the neces-
sary and proper clause. Then he made a more sweeping 
argument: 
126. /d. at 1117-18, 1294. 
127. /d. at 1835-1836. See also id. at 1263 (remarks by Rep. Broomall) (listing free 
speech as one of the "rights and immunities of citizens"); id. at 1266 (remarks of Rep. 
Raymond) {listing "right to bear arms" as a right of citizens); id. at 1293-1294 {remarks of 
Rep. Shellabarger) {right of petition is an "indispensable" right of citizenship). Another 
purported source of rights was the fifth amendment. See id. at 1152, 1270 (remarks of Rep. 
Thayer); id. at 1294 {remarks of Rep. Wilson). Cf. id. at 1157 (remarks of Rep. Thornton); 
id. at 340 (remarks of Sen. Cowan). There were also citations to the thirteenth amend-
ment. See, e.g., id. at 1152 (remarks of Rep. Thayer); id. at App. 157 {remarks of Rep. 
Wilson). 
128. !d. at 530. See also Johnson's expostulation in response to a contrary argument 
by Senator Henderson, id. at 572, as well as Senator Morrill's statement, id. at 570 (alle-
giance and protection the essential elements of citizenship). 
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But throwing aside the letter of the Constitution, there are characteristics of 
Governments that belong to them as such, without which they would cease to be 
Governments. The rights and duties of allegiance and protection are correspond-
ing rights and duties .... [Wherever] I owe allegiance to my country. there it 
owes me protection. and wherever my Government owes me no protection I owe 
it no allegiance and can commit no treason. 
Broomall attacked the idea that such protection could be left to 
the states, inasmuch as "everybody knows that the rights and im-
munities of citizens were habitually and systematically denied in 
certain States to the citizens of other States: the right of speech, 
the right of transit, the right of domicile, the right to sue, the writ 
of habeas corpus, and the right of petition." He also argued that 
the necessity for the bill was not limited to the black man, since 
loyal whites were being denied their basic rights in the South. t29 
Representative Wilson made one of the most forceful argu-
ments based on the duty to protect. In his view, the rights pro-
tected by the Civil Rights Bill were "simply the absolute rights of 
individuals" or "the natural rights of man." He contended that 
the bill did not establish new rights, but instead protected and en-
forced those which already belonged to every citizen. In his opin-
ion, the comity clause entitled every citizen to federal protection 
of personal rights: 
I reassert that the possession of these rights by the citizen raises by necessary 
implication the power in Congress to protect them. If a citizen of the United 
States should go abroad, and while within the jurisdiction of a foreign Power be 
despoiled of his rights of personal security, personal liberty. or personal property 
contrary to the due course of law of the nation inflicting the wrong. this Govern-
ment would espouse his cause and enforce redress even to the extremity of war . 
. . Well. if all the terrible powers of war may be resorted to for the protec-
tion of the rights of our citizens when those rights are disregarded and trampled 
on beyond our jurisdiction, is it possible that our Constitution is so defective that 
we have no power under it to protect our citizens within our own jurisdiction 
through the peaceful means of statutes and courts~ 
Under this broad principle I rest my justification of this bill. I assert that we 
possess the power to do those things which Governments are organized to do; that 
we may protect the citizen of the United States against a violation of his rights by 
the law of a single State; . . . that this power permeates our whole system. is a 
part of it. without which the States can run riot over every fundamental right 
belonging to citizens of the United States; that the right to exercise this power 
depends upon no express delegation, but runs with the rights it is designed to 
protect. .. I30 
129. /d. at 1263-64. 
130. !d. at 1117-19. Wilson reiterated essentially the same argument. /d. at App. 157 
and ld. at 1294. See also. id. at 1293 (remarks of Rep. Shellabarger). In a similar vein. see 
1d. at 632 (remarks of Rep. Hubbard on the Freedman's Bureau Bill); ld. at 654 (remarks of 
Rep. McKee). 
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After President Johnson's veto, Trumbull made a major 
speech in the Senate defending the bill against Johnson's charges. 
He asserted that 
[t]o be a citizen of the United States carries with it some rights; . . . They are 
those inherent, fundamental rights which belong to free citizens or free men in all 
countries, such as the rights enumerated in this bill, and they belong to them in all 
the States of the Union. The right of American citizenship means something. 
Trumbull stated that citizens are entitled to protection within the 
States as well as abroad. He contended that the rights of life, lib-
erty and property are "inalienable rights, belonging to every citi-
zen of the United States, as such, no matter where he may be;" 
American citizenship "would have little worth" if it did not carry 
protection with it. 
How is it that every person born in these United States owes allegiance to the 
Government? Everything that he is or has. his propeny and his life, may be taken 
by the Government of the United States in its defense ... and can it be that ... 
we have got a Government which is all-powerful to command the obedience of 
the citizen, but has no power to alford him protectionry Is that all that this boasted 
American citizenship amounts to? . . . Sir, it cannot be. Such is not the meaning 
of our Constitution. Such is not the meaning of American citizenship. This Gov-
ernment, which would go to war to protect its meanest-! will not say citizen-
inhabitant ... in any foreign land whose rights were unjustly encroached upon. 
has cenainly some power to protect its own citizens in their own country. Alle-
giance and protection are reciprocal rights. 131 
Senator Johnson responded to Trumbull's arguments with a line 
of reasoning that probably would have been regarded as convinc-
ing prior to the Civil War. Trumbull's theory, he contended. 
begged the question-it was the business of the federal govern-
ment to protect its citizens, but only with respect to matters within 
federal jurisdiction.132 
In the House, Representative Lawrence responded to the 
President's veto by asserting that the bill protected rights "recog-
nized by the Constitution as existing anterior to and indepen-
dently of all laws and all constitutions." It was, he maintained, 
"idle to say that a citizen shall have the right to life, yet to deny 
him the right to labor, whereby alone he can live." More, "[i]t is 
worse than mockery to say that men may be clothed by the na-
tional authority with the character of citizens, yet may be stripped 
by State authority of the means by which citizens may exist." In 
his view, "Congress has the incidental power to enforce and pro-
tect the equal enjoyment in the States of civil rights which are 
131. /d. at 1757. 
132. /d. at 1777. 
1984] FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 269 
inherent in national citizenship." I33 
Although Senator Johnson's argument was technically 
stronger, his opponents' arguments were politically irresistible. 
The nation had fought a civil war to establish the primary alle-
giance of citizens to the federal government. In fighting that war, 
the government had sent thousands of men, many of them draft-
ees, to their deaths. The South was still essentially an occupied 
territory. A government that had required such sacrifices from its 
citizens could not be denied the power to protect their most funda-
mental rights. 
c 
Section 1 of the fourteenth amendment, despite its enormous 
importance today, was the subject of relatively little debate in 
Congress. This has always puzzled scholars. Some have con-
cluded that the brevity of the debate indicates that the amendment 
was designed to create only an extremely narrow set of rights. We 
believe, on the contrary, that the debates were short because the 
fourteenth amendment was intended to create no rights at all. 
Republicans generally believed that fundamental rights already 
existed, at least as a matter of natural law and the law of nations, 
and that Congress probably already possessed the power to pro-
tect these rights. The fourteenth amendment was merely designed 
to perfect that protection. It would ensure a secure constitutional 
basis for congressional action and provide a self-executing re-
straint on the states. The nature and source of these rights had 
been discussed by Republicans since the party was formed in the 
1850's, and had received intensive consideration in Congress at 
least since the debates on the thirteenth amendment. Congress-
men felt little need to reiterate what had already been discussed 
for so many years.I34 
133. /d. at 1832-35. 2 J. BLAINE, TWENTY YEARS OF CONGRESS 177-178 (1886). 
quotes an impassioned speech by Trumbull: 
It cannot be that we have constituted a government ... which is all-powerful to 
command the obedience of the citizen but has no power to afford him protec-
tion .... Tell it not. sir .... to the father whose son was starved at Anderson-
ville. or the widow whose husband was slain at Mission Ridge. or the little boy 
who leads his sightless father through the streets of your city. or the thousand 
other mangled heroes to be seen on every side of us to-day. that this Government. 
in defense of which the son and the husband fell. the father lost his sight and the 
others were maimed and crippled. had the right to call these persons to its de-
fense, but now has no power to protect the survivors or their friends in any rights 
whatever in the States. Such, sir, is not the meaning of our Constitution; such is 
not the meaning of American citizenship. Allegiance and protection are recipro-
cal rights. 
134. See H. BELZ, supra note 87, at 172. 
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Before the House took up the Civil Rights Bill, it had consid-
ered a proposed constitutional amendment of Representative 
Bingham's, which provided: 
The Congress shall have power to make all laws which shall be necessary and 
proper to secure to the citizens of each State all privileges and immunities of 
citizens in the several States, and to all persons in the several States equal protec-
tion in the rights of life, liberty. and property.135 
Bingham called attention to the fact that the proposal used ex-
isting constitutional language except for the portion conferring 
power on Congress. The remainder, he said, was in the comity 
clause and the due process clause of the fifth amendment. The 
majority view among Republicans was that Congress already had 
the power to protect these rights. Bingham, however, disagreed. 
He believed that under the original Constitution, enforcement 
rested solely with state officers, who were obligated by their oaths 
to protect these rights. In a later speech, he made it clear that the 
amendment was intended to protect loyal white citizens whose 
property had been confiscated in the South, and also to apply to 
"other States . . . that have in their constitutions and laws to-day 
provisions in direct violation of every principle of our 
Constitution." t36 
Debate on Bingham's proposal was brief. Its supporters ar-
gued variously that the national government already had the 
power to defend the rights of citizens but that the amendment 
would remove any doubts; that it would give Congress the power 
to enforce only the original comity clause; and that it merely gave 
Congress power to protect "the natural rights which necessarily 
pertain to citizenship."t37 
Bingham denied that the provision deprived any state of its 
rights. Rather, it simply would arm Congress with the power to 
enforce "the bill of rights as it stands in the Constitution to-day." 
He then quoted the comity clause and the fifth amendment. He 
derided the notion that any state had reserved to itself the power 
to deny these rights, which he said were "universal and independ-
ent of all local State legislation" and "belong, by the gift of God," 
to all. He found it anomalous that the federal government had 
power to vindicate the rights of citizens abroad, but not the power 
in peacetime to enforce those rights at home. In response to an 
attack by Representative Hale, Bingham seemed unclear about 
135. Co!'G. GLOBE. 39th Cong .. 1st Sess. 1033-34 (1866). See also id. at 1292. 
136. /d. at 1065. 
137. !d. at 1062-63 (remarks of Rep. Kelley); id. at 1066 (remarks of Rep. Price); td. at 
1088 (remarks of Rep. Woodbridge). 
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whether his proposal would give Congress the police power or 
merely power to ensure that states treated all their citizens alike 
with respect to protection of fundamental rights.Bs 
Representative Hotchkiss then took the floor. He explained 
that he would vote to postpone consideration of the amendment 
until it could be modified. In his view, Congress might someday 
fall into the control of the former rebels. Basic rights should not 
be wholly relegated to Congressional control but should also be 
directly protected by the Constitution: 
This amendment provides that Congress may pass laws to enforce these rights. 
Why not provide by an amendment to the Constitution that no State shall dis-
criminate against any class of its citizens; and let that amendment stand as a part 
of the organic law of the land, subject only to be defeated by another constitu-
tional amendment. We may pass laws here to-day, and the next Congress may 
wipe them out.l39 
Representative Conkling then moved to postpone consideration of 
the measure, and this passed with virtually all Republicans (in-
cluding Bingham) voting in favor. 
On April 9, 1866, the House overrode the president's veto 
and the Civil Rights Bill became law. On April 21, Representa-
tive Stevens placed before the Joint Committee a reconstruction 
plan proposed by Robert Owen. One aspect was a proposed con-
stitutional amendment. After some maneuvering in committee, 
Bingham was successful in having the original language of the 
proposal replaced by his own formulation: 
No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or im-
munities of the citizens of the United States; nor shall any state deprive any per-
son of life, liberty or property without due process of law, nor deny to any person 
within its jurisdiction equal protection of the laws. 
This language was quite similar to that contained in Bingham's 
earlier proposal. The significant difference was that the earlier 
proposal was couched as a grant of congressional power; the new 
one was phrased as a limitation on state power. Bingham said 
138. /d. at 1088-94. Bingham's ambivalence on this issue was shared by many others. 
While the moderate Republicans who sponsored the fourteenth amendment understood 
the need to make some modifications in federalism, they had not lost their respect for the 
autonomy of the states. See, e.g., H. BELz, supra note 87, at 158-59. They assumed that the 
state governments would protect the fundamental rights of some citizens, at least the most 
favored classes of whites. Thus, if only the states would furnish the same protection to the 
rights of others, such as blacks, there would be no need for federal intervention. See Bene-
dict. Preserving the Constitution: The Conservative Basis of Radical Reconstruction, 61 J. 
AM. HIST. 65, 78-83 (1974); BELZ, supra, at 164-65, 167. When federal intervention did 
take place, it wo~ld be limited to the protection of fundamental rights. Thus, they hoped, 
federal mterventwn would be only occasional and limited in its scope. H. BELZ, supra, at 
131-34, 173-74. 
139. CoNG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1095 (1866). 
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that the change was motivated by his reading of Chief Justice 
Marshall's opinion in Barron v. Baltimore .l4D He explained that 
the privileges and immunities he had in mind were largely defined 
in the first eight amendments to the Constitution.l41 
Most of the debate on the fourteenth amendment concerned 
the now-forgotten provisions of sections 2 and 3. Moderate 
Republicans were apparently not yet prepared to mandate black 
suffrage. As a substitute, they proposed a three-part solution to 
the problem of protecting the blacks. Section 1 would ensure pro-
tection for fundamental civil rights, presumably excluding suf-
frage. Section 2 would reduce Southern representation in the 
House to the extent that Southern states denied blacks the right to 
vote. Section 3 would compensate for a possible lack of black suf-
frage by imposing political disabilities on Confederate supporters. 
Despite the focus on other sections, some significant state-
ments were made about section 1 in the House. In opening the 
debate, Representative Stevens noted that the provisions of sec-
tion 1 were "all asserted, in some form or other, in our DECLA-
RATION or organic law." But the Constitution had limited only 
the power of Congress rather than that of the states; this amend-
ment supplied the missing limitation.l42 Representative Garfield, 
the next supporter of the amendment to speak, expressed regret 
that it did not provide for suffrage, for he believed "that the right 
to vote, . . . is so necessary to the protection of . . . natural rights 
as to be indispensable, and therefore equal to natural rights."l43 
The next speaker noted that the amendment merely brought into 
the Constitution "what is found in the bill of rights of every State 
of the Union" and incorporated the principle of the Civil Rights 
Act into the Constitution.l44 Several others noted that they had 
supported the Civil Rights Act and believed it to be constitutional, 
but were supporting the amendment to remove any possible 
doubts.l45 Some referred to the Declaration of Independence as 
140. 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 ( 1833). 
141. See J. JAMES, THE FRAMING OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 104-06 (1956). 
142. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong .• 1st Sess. 2459 ( 1866) (capitals in original). Similarly. 
in a speech made while the amendment was before the county. Representative Schenck 
said it put into the Constitution "those principles of liberty and equality which were under-
stood to be in the Constitution ... by those who framed it." Cincinnati Commercial, Aug. 
20. 1866, at 2. col. 5. In another such speech, Gen. Rutherford Hayes spoke of the duty of 
the United States, in return for the allegiance of the citizen, "to hold up before him the 
broad shield of the Constitution." /d., Sept 8, 1866, at 2, col. 4. 
143. CoNG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2462 (1866). 
144. /d. at 2465. 
145. !d. at 2498 (remarks of Rep. Broomall); id. at 2468 (remarks of Rep. Kelley); id. 
at 2502 (remarks of Rep. Raymond); td. at 2511 (remarks of Rep. Eliot). 
1984] FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 273 
the source of the rights protected by the amendment.t46 
Near the close of the debates on section I, Representative 
Bingham took the floor. He explained that the purpose of the 
amendment was to give Congress power "to protect by national 
law the privileges and immunities of all the citizens of the Repub-
lic and the inborn rights of every person in its jurisdiction."I47 As 
before, he maintained that the amendment took from the states no 
power that had ever been rightfully theirs. Shortly afterwards, the 
House passed the joint resolution proposing the constitutional 
amendment. 
On May 23, the Senate began consideration of the proposed 
amendment. Since the Senate Chairman of the Joint Committee 
was ill, the joint resolution was presented by Senator Howard. As 
to the privileges and immunities clause, he said it would be "a 
curious question to solve what are the privileges and immunities 
of citizens of each of the States in the several States." He then 
quoted at length from Justice Washington's opinion in Corfield v. 
Coryell, which had given a fundamental rights interpretation to 
the comity clause. Howard then continued that these privileges 
and immunities "are not and cannot be fully defined in their en-
tire extent and precise nature .... " To those undefined privi-
leges and immunities under the comity clause, he said, must be 
added the rights guaranteed by the first eight amendments of the 
Constitution, which he enumerated. He noted, for example, that 
the restriction against taking private property without just com-
pensation applied only to Congress, not to the states. Under the 
existing Constitution, Congress had no power to enforce the Bill 
of Rights. The proposed amendment would provide an affirma-
tive source of power to protect these rights. Howard spoke only 
briefly about the equal protection clause, saying it would abolish 
all "class legislation in the States and [do] away with the injustice 
of subjecting one caste of persons to a code not applicable to 
another." t4s 
After the Senate debate on May 23, Republican senators met 
in caucus about the proposed constitutional amendment. The 
joint resolution came before the Senate again on May 29. As a 
result of the caucus, amendments were made to sections 2 and 3, 
and the citizenship clause was added to section I. Senator How-
ard explained that in his view the fourteenth amendment was 
146. See Jd. at 2510 (remarks of Rep. Miller); 1d. at 2539 (remarks of Rep. 
Farnsworth). 
147. /d. at 2542. 
148. /d. at 2765-66. 
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"simply declaratory of what I regard as the law of the land al-
ready, that every person born within the limits of the United 
States, and subject to their jurisdiction, is by virtue of natural law 
and national law a citizen of the United States." 149 
After the caucus amendments were passed by party vote, sig-
nificant Senate debate virtually ended, apparently because Senate 
Republicans had resolved their differences in secret caucus. At 
various points in the brief remaining debate, references were 
made to the reciprocal nature of allegiance and protection, as well 
as to the fundamental rights protected by the comity clause.1so 
The most important question raised by the debates is what 
rights the amendment was to protect. The legislative history 
shows that these rights at least included those fundamental rights 
described in the Coryell opinion and protected by the Civil Rights 
Bill. It was, after all, one purpose of the amendment to make the 
constitutionality of the Civil Rights Bill clear. On the other hand, 
the right to vote was probably not protected by section 1, though 
many of the amendment's supporters would have liked to grant 
such protection.1s1 The major speeches by Bingham and Howard 
suggest that the Bill of Rights was incorporated into the four-
teenth amendment. Quite likely, these were the men to whom 
members of Congress would have turned for an interpretation of 
the amendment.1s2 
Howard's speech also suggests that to some extent the content 
of the privileges and immunities clause was to be left to later judi-
cial interpretation.ls3 As Representative Patterson had noted in 
the debates on the thirteenth amendment, "the English definition 
of justice and liberty in the Twelfth Century is not the definition 
of the Nineteenth Century. Our interpretation of these terms in 
the future of our history will vary with education and local 
prejudices." 154 So perhaps the framers realized, as Bickel main-
tained, that the amendment's precise content in some sense was in 
149. !d. at 2890. 
ISO. See. e.g .. id. at 2918 (remarks of Sen. Willey); Jd. at 2919 (remarks of Sen. Davis); 
id. at 2892-93 (remarks of Sen. Conness); id. at 2896 (remarks of Sen. Howard); Jd. at 2961 
(remarks of Sen. Poland); Jd. at App. 219 (remarks of Sen. Howe); Jd. at 3031-35 (remarks 
of Sen. Henderson). See also. id. at App. 256 (remarks of Rep. Baker); id. at App. 293 
(remarks of Rep. Shellabarger). 
!51. See R. BERGER. GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY. supra note 118, at 52-68. 
152. See Ely. Constitutionalfnterpretavism: Its Allure and !mpossibrli~l'. supra note 85. 
at 428-433. 
153. Howard said that the privileges and immunities "are not and cannot be fully de-
fined in their entire extent and precise nature" and cited Cotjield to "gather some intima-
tion of what probably will be the opinion of the judiciary." CONG. GLOBE. 39th Cong .. 1st 
Sess. 2765-66 (1866). 
154. CoNG. GLOBE. 38th Cong .. 2d Sess. 484 (1865). 
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the hands of future generations. In any event, thirty years of de-
bate since Brown have failed to produce any consensus on the ex-
act rights the framers had in mind; we see little point in 
continuing the attempt to discern clues about their precise views 
on a subject which they discussed so inattentively. 1ss 
The entire theory behind the amendment argues against giv-
ing it an unduly crabbed interpretation.Is6 Recall that the basic 
theory of the Civil Rights Act was that the federal government 
had at least as much power to protect its citizens at home as it did 
when they were abroad. Our government would presumably pro-
test if American citizens abroad were punished for their political 
or religious beliefs, had their property seized without compensa-
tion, or were subjected to unfair trials or cruel and unusual pun-
ishments. The general theory of the Civil Rights Act was that 
Congress had the same power to protect citizens at home. Those 
like Bingham, who thought that Congress did not yet have such 
power, believed that the fourteenth amendment supplied the miss-
ing authority to protect basic human rights.Is7 
III 
In reading the voluminous statements of the Republicans, 
both in the 1850's and during the Civil War and reconstruction, it 
is often difficult to determine the precise import of their remarks 
to legal issues of interest today. The search to find a specific, clear 
155. The main thesis of Raoul Berger's work is that the privileges and immunities 
clause included only the rights listed in the Civil Rights Act. See R. BERGER, GoVERN-
MENT BY JUDICIARY, supra note 118, at 20-36. For some responses by critics, see Dimond, 
Strict Construction and Judicial Review if Racial Discrimination Under the Equal Protection 
Clause: Meeting Raoul Berger on lnterpretivist Grounds 80 MICH. L. REV. 462 (1982); 
Soifer, Protecting Civil Rights: A Critique of Raoul Berger's History, 54 N.Y.U. L. REV. 651 
(1979); and for Berger's rebuttal arguments, see Berger, Paul Dimond Fails to 'Meet Raoul 
Berger on lnterpretivist Grounds', 43 OHIO ST. L.J. 285 (1982); Berger, Incorporation of the 
Bi/1 of Rights in the Fourteenth Amendment: A Nine-Lived Cat 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 435 (1981 ). 
We have no desire to enter into what now appears likely to become an interminable and 
increasingly intemperate debate. Instead, we would offer two brief observations. First, 
Berger's argument seems to be strongest when he attempts to demonstrate a specific intent 
to exclude cenain specific rights such as voting, though even here the point is at least sub-
ject to dispute. See Van Alstyne, The Fourteenth Amendment, the 'Right' to Vote, and the 
Understanding if the Thirty-Ninth Congress, 1965 SuP. CT. REv. 33. Second, we have 
shown that, from well before the Civil War until after 1866, the Republicans clearly consid-
ered a number of other rights to be fundamental. Berger does not, in our view, carry the 
burden of demonstrating an intent to exclude these other fundamental rights from the cov-
erage of the Amendment. 
156. For a strong argument in favor of giving a broad reading to the fundamental-
rights guarantee of the founeenth amendment, see R. Kaczorowski, The Nationalization of 
Civil Rights (Univ. of Minn. Ph.D. thesis, 1971). 
157. The equal protection clause and due process clause refer to "persons" rather than 
"citizens," thus providing aliens with at least some degree of protection. 
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legislative intent on all the various problems of interpretation of 
the fourteenth amendment is doomed to failure. But while spe-
cific intentions may have remained unclear, the overall Republi-
can theme from 1856 to 1866 is unmistakable. Their mission, 
beginning even before the formation of the Republican party itself 
and continuing through reconstruction, was to bridge the gap be-
tween their views on human rights and the realities of the Ameri-
can legal system. Moderates and radicals were divided, not by 
disagreement on this basic goal, but by considerations of tactics 
and strategy. 
Antislavery Republicans came to power with a well devel-
oped theory of human rights. In their view, human rights derived 
from natural law and its offshoot, the law of nations. As a result 
of the social compact, government was under an obligation to pro-
tect certain human rights. Among these rights were property and 
freedom of speech.1ss The antislavery Republicans recognized, 
however, that a state might violate this obligation by enacting leg-
islation contrary to natural law. They did not contest the legal 
validity of such legislation within the state's own boundaries. 
They did maintain that such legislation was entitled to no respect 
outside those boundaries, except as required by some other posi-
tive law such as the fugitive slave clause. In short, they recognized 
that a gap could exist between higher law and an actual legal 
system. 
After the Republicans came to power, they sought to narrow 
this gap. In the thirteenth amendment, they vindicated the natu-
ral rights of slaves by giving them freedom. In the Civil Rights 
Act, they exercised what they believed to be the inherent power of 
the federal government under the law of nations to protect the 
fundamental rights of its citizens. Finally, in the fourteenth 
amendment, they sought to constitutionalize this protection in two 
ways. First, they sought to embody the protection in a self-execut-
ing constitutional provision. Second, they intended to remove any 
possible doubts about congressional power to protect fundamental 
rights. 
One of the great achievements of the Republicans in the early 
reconstruction period was to establish the meaning of American 
citizenship. Before the Civil War, American citizenship was an 
158. Belz confirms that freedom of speech was considered a civil rather than a political 
right. H. BELZ, supra note 87, at xii-xiii, 157-58. A~rding to Benedict, family relation-
ships were also consistently considered fundamental nghts by Republicans. See Bened1ct. 
Equality and Expediency in the Reconstruction Era, 23 CIVIL WAR HISTORY 328 ( 1977): H. 
HYMAN & W. WIECEK, EQUAL JUSTICE UNDER LAW: CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT, 
1835-1875, at 302 (1982). 
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ill-defined and largely insignificant concept. For most purposes, 
state citizenship was far more significant. The Civil War changed 
all that by establishing that a citizen's primary allegiance was to 
the federal government. Thus, the concept of national citizenship 
became triumphant. But it was not enough simply to proclaim the 
existence of citizenship, it was also necessary to give content to 
that citizenship. 
After the Civil Rights Act and the fourteenth amendment, 
citizenship would mean more than the right to an American pass-
port when traveling abroad. Instead, American citizenship would 
be linked to the possession of fundamental rights, protected 
against violation by any level of government within the United 
States. The creation of American citizenship was one of the great 
accomplishments of the fourteenth amendment. This accomplish-
ment was not the result of pure political philosophy. Rather it 
arose from a complex interaction between the exigencies of recon-
struction and Republican political thought, which itself was a del-
icate accommodation between higher-law theories and political 
realism. 
Today, of course, the most significant question is the identity 
of the fundamental rights protected by the fourteenth amendment. 
History gives no clear answer. The framers were providing a 
mechanism to protect rights rather than creating new rights; thus, 
they had little reason to focus carefully on the identity of the 
rights involved. We know they considered freedom of speech to 
be fundamental, and they may well have had at least some other 
parts of the Bill of Rights in mind. While the specifics are unclear, 
there can be no doubt of their general intent. As a Supreme Court 
Justice was to put it almost a century later, the fourteenth amend-
ment was intended "to embrace those rights which are fundamen-
tal; which belong to the citizens of all free governments, for the 
purposes of securing which men enter into society." I 59 Before the 
Civil War, these rights were largely entrusted to the protection of 
the states. The fourteenth amendment commemorated a new so-
cial compact. For the first time, the federal government claimed 
the exclusive allegiance of its citizens, in return for its commit-
ment to protect their fundamental rights. 
. 159. Poe v. Ullman. 367 U.S. 497,541 (1961) (Harlan, J., disseming) (emphasis in orig-
mal; mternal brackets, citations and quotation marks omitted). 
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A NOTE ON SOURCES 
The original version of this article contained rather exhaustive documentation. In the in-
terest of readability-and at the cost of great mental anguish-we have pared the original 
512 footnotes down to 159. Readers who would like to consult the original, more fully 
documented version, are invited to write either the authors or the editors for copies of the 
original manuscript and footnotes. 
Instead of the original complete documentation, we have decided to present a brief 
discussion of the sources which we found most helpful. We began. of course. with the 
classic fourteenth amendment studies of tenBroeck, Bickel, James, and Fairman. But we 
also gave close attention to numerous other sources. 
On the pre-Civil War period, we relied heavily for background on D. Potter's IMPEND-
ING CRISIS (1976) and A. Nevins's ORDEAL OF THE UNION (1947) and EMERGENCE OF 
LINCOLN (1950). P. MILLER, LIFE OF THE MIND IN AMERICA (1965), helped set the intel-
lectual stage. A number of recent works have intensively studied the origins and rise of the 
Republican party. E. Foner's FREE SOIL, FREE LABOR, FREE MEN: THE IDEOLOGY OF 
THE REPUBLICAN PARTY (1970), was the single most useful source for our purposes. We 
also found excellent material, however, in J. MAYFIELD, REHEARSAL FOR REPUBLICANISM 
(1980); K. STAMPP, IMPERILED UNION: ESSAYS ON THE BACKGROUND OF THE CIVIL WAR 
(1980); R. SEWELL, BALLOTS FOR FREEDOM (1976); H. TREFOUSSE, THE RADICAL REPUB-
LICANS (1968); E. FONER, POLITICS AND IDEOLOGY IN THE AGE OF THE CIVIL WAR (1980); 
and F. BLUE, THE FREE SOlLERS (1973). Additional useful material on Republican views 
was provided by H. PERKINS, NORTHERN EDITORIALS ON SECESSION (1942). 
Some of the best, as well as the most readable, material on this period is found in 
biographies. Among the most useful for our purposes were H. TREFoussE, BENJAMIN 
FRANKLIN WADE (1963); G. VANDEUSEN, WILLIAN HENRY SEWARD (1967); D. DoNALD, 
CHARLES SUMNER AND THE COMING OF THE CIVIL WAR (1960); R. SEWELL, JoHN P. 
HALE AND THE POLITICS OF ABOLITION (1965); J. STEWART, JOSHUA GIDDINGS AND THE 
TACTICS OF RADICAL POLITICS (1976); D. FEHRENBACHER, PRELUDE TO GREATNESS 
(1962); and D. DONALD, LINCOLN'S HERNDON (1948). We also found useful material in R. 
NYE, WILLIAM LLOYD GARRISON (1955); F. FESSENDEN, WILLIAM PITT FESSENDEN 
(1907); H. MILLER, THADDEUS STEVENS (1939); H. COMMAGER, THEODORE PARKER 
(1936); M. DUBERMAN, CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS (1961); A. HART, SALMON PORTLAND 
CHASE ( 1899); W. KING, LINCOLN'S MANAGER (1960); C. Riggs, The Ante-Bellum Career of 
John Bingham (1958) (unpublished Ph.D. thesis); and S. BEMIS, JOHN QUINCY ADAMS 
AND THE UNION (1956). 
There are a number of excellent recent books on ante-bellum legal thinking. D. 
Fehrenbacher's THE DRED SCOTT CASE: ITS SIGNIFICANCE IN AMERICAN LAW AND POLI-
TICS (1978), and R. Cover's JusTICE AccusED (1978), played a prominent role in our 
thinking. We also found useful material in W. WIECEK, SOURCES OF ANTI-SLAVERY CoN-
STITUTIONALISM IN AMERICA (1977); P. PALUDAN, A CoVENANT WITH DEATH: THE CoN-
STITUTION, LAW, AND EQUALITY IN THE CIVIL WAR ERA (1975); R. NYE, FETTERED 
FREEDOMS (1949); R. BRIDWELL & R. WHITTEN, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE COMMON 
LAW (1977); as well as Swisher's extraordinarily good volume on the Taney Court in the 
Holmes Devise History of the Supreme Court. We also consulted treatises by Kent, Story, 
Sedgwick, Wheaton, Rawle and Lieber. As background, we sampled the literature on the 
social contract theorists and natural law theory prior to the American Revolution. but we 
certainly claim no expertise in this area. 
On the role of natural law thinking in American law, the classic references are C. 
HAINES, THE REVIVAL OF NATURAL LAW CONCEPTS (1930); B. WRIGHT, AMERICAN IN-
TERPRETATIONS OF NATURAL LAW: A STUDY IN THE HISTORY OF POLITICAL THOUGHT 
(1931); and Corwin, The Doctrine of Due Process of Law Before the Civil War, 24 HARV. L. 
REV. 366 (1911). Nelson's articles, including his study of the impact of antislavery thought 
on styles of judicial reasoning, 87 HARV. L. REV. 513 (1974), are also quite useful. 
The literature on reconstruction is enormous. We relied primarily on the following 
works: M. BENEDICT, A COMPROMISE OF PRINCIPLE (1974); H. HYMAN, NEW FRONTIERS 
OF AMERICAN RECONSTRUCTION (1966); L. Cox & D. Cox, POLITICS, PRINCIPLE, AND 
PREJUDICE, 1865-1866 ( 1963); E. McKITTRICK, ANDREW JOHNSON & RECONSTRUCTION 
1984] FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 279 
(1960); K. STAMPP, THE ERA OF RECONSTRUCTION {1965); K. STAMPP & L. LITWACK, 
RECONSTRUCTION (1969); H. BELZ, RECONSTRUCTING THE UNION: THEORY AND POLICY 
DURING THE CIVIL WAR (1969); T. WILSON, THE BLACK CODES OF THE SOUTH (1965); H. 
HYMAN, A MoRE PERFECT UNION: THE IMPACT OF THE CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUC-
TION ON THE CONSTITUTION (1973); H. Belz, A NEW BIRTH OF FREEDOM: THE REPUBLI-
CAN PARTY AND FREEDMEN'S RIGHTS, 1861 TO 1866 (1976); H. BELZ, EMANCIPATION Ar-oD 
EQUAL RIGHTS; POLITICS AND CONSTITUTIONALISM IN THE CIVIL WAR ERA (1978); D. 
Dor-oALD, CHARLES SUMNER AND THE RIGHTS OF MAN ( 1970); H. HYMAN & W. WIECEK, 
EQUAL JUSTICE UNDER LAW: CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT, 1835-1875 ( 1982); and H. 
HYMAN, RADICAL REPUBLICANS AND RECONSTRUCTION (1967). Helpful background was 
provided by J. KETTNER, THE DEVELOPMENT OF AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP, 1608-1870 
(1978); M. KELLER, AFFAIRS OF STATE (1977); and C. FAIRMAN, RECONSTRUCTION AND 
REUNION {1971). 
The foregoing does not include all the works we consulted, let alone the excellent 
writings we undoubtedly overlooked, or the unpublished source materials we ignored en-
tirely. It is a sobering thought that this list merely scratches the surface. 
